Globalization, Technology, and the Skill Premium*

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Abstract

We construct a model of international trade and multinational production (MP) to examine the impact of globalization on the skill premium in developed and developing countries. Our framework extends the Heckscher-Ohlin model by incorporating productivity differences across producers within a sector, skill-biased technology (more efficient producers employ a relatively higher share of skilled workers), and MP. Reductions in trade and/or MP costs induce a reallocation of resources both towards sectors that are intensive in a country’s abundant factor (generating a between effect that increases the skill premium in skill-abundant countries and reduces it in skill-scarce countries) and within sectors towards more efficient producers that are more skill intensive (generating a within effect that increases the skill premium in all countries). We study how the model’s parameters determine the strength of these effects.

Using a parameterized version of the model that matches salient features of U.S. data on trade and MP, we study the impact on the skill premium of changes in the extent of globalization (the shares of trade and MP in output) and in the composition of globalization (the relative importance of skill-abundant and skill-scarce countries in the global economy). Central to many of our results is the fact that the within effect is stronger than the between effect. In response to the three-fold increase in the extent of globalization in the U.S. over the last 40 years, the model generates an increase in the skill premium of 4% to 6% in the U.S. (or 1/6 to 1/4 of the rise of the college wage premium during this period) and 5% in skill-scarce countries.

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1 Introduction

The nature of globalization has changed. The value of world trade as a share of world output, the sales of foreign affiliates as a share of world output, and the developing world’s share of this global activity have grown tremendously over the last few decades. Over this period there was also a large increase in income inequality, both in developed and developing countries, as measured for example by the rise in the relative wage of skilled to unskilled workers—the skill premium. The changing nature of globalization and the increase in the skill premium raise a set of important questions. To what extent can the growth of trade and multinational production (MP) account for the rise in the skill premium in developed and developing countries? What are the different implications for the skill premium in developed countries of globalization with developing countries versus globalization with developed countries?

In this paper we construct a multi-country model of international trade and MP to address these and other questions. Our framework builds on the classic model of trade and inequality, the two-factor (skilled and unskilled labor) Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model, using the quantitative apparatus developed by Eaton and Kortum (2002) (henceforth EK).\(^1\) We extend the H-O model in three key dimensions. First, as in much of the recent trade literature our framework incorporates productivity differences across producers within sectors, motivated by the large observed heterogeneity in size and export status within sectors; see e.g. Bernard and Jensen (1999). Second, our framework allows for an arbitrary factor bias of technology. When technology is skill biased, more efficient producers employ a higher share of skilled workers. This feature of the model enables us to address in a simple way the empirical evidence that exporters and large producers in manufacturing tend to be relatively skill intensive; see e.g. Bernard et. al. (2007) for U.S. firms, Verhoogen (2008) for Mexican firms, and Alcalá and Hernández (2009) for Spanish firms. Third, motivated by the fact that sales of U.S. foreign affiliates are larger than the value of U.S. exports, our model incorporates multinational production (MP), giving producers the ability to use their technologies, at a cost, to produce in foreign countries, as in Ramondo and Rodriguez-Clare (2009).

In Sections 3 and 4, we examine analytically the workings of a simplified version of our model. We prove that starting in autarky, a reduction in trade costs generates what we call the between effect: labor reallocates between sectors as countries specialize in their comparative advantage sector, increasing the relative demand for skill and the skill premium in the country with a comparative advantage in the skill-intensive sector and reducing the relative demand for skill and the skill premium in the other country. Under standard assumptions on technological differences across countries, the between effect predicts that falling trade costs increase (reduce) the skill premium.

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\(^1\)Other models that combine elements of H-O and either Ricardian or Krugman-style models include Treffer (1993) and (1995), Davis (1995), Harrigan (1997), Davis and Weinstein (2001), Romalis (2004), Costinot (2005), Chor (2008), and Morrow (2008). While these papers focus on the role of endowment and technology differences in explaining observed trade patterns, our focus is on the impact of globalization on the skill premium.
in a skill-abundant (skill-scarce) country. However, ample empirical evidence demonstrates that the between effect is weak; see e.g. Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) for a review of evidence that globalization tends to increase the skill premium in countries abundant in unskilled labor, contrary to the prediction of the between effect.

We provide a simple mechanism to explain why the between effect is weak. We show that for a fixed share of trade in output, greater productivity dispersion across producers within sectors mitigates the between effect. Intuitively, as producers become more heterogeneous, differences in productivity become relatively more important for shaping trade patterns than factor endowment differences. This reduces sectoral specialization; i.e. greater technological heterogeneity across producers reduces the difference in a country’s import shares across sectors. We then show that the strength of the between effect, conditional on trade volumes, is fully determined by this difference in import shares across sectors. When differences in import shares across sectors are smaller (i.e. when technological heterogeneity is greater), the between effect is weaker. We use this logic in our quantitative analysis to assess the strength of the between effect.

Next, we show that if technology is skill biased, then reductions in trade costs increase the skill premium in all countries through what we call the within effect: as trade costs decline, the relative demand for skill increases because labor shifts within sectors towards the most efficient producers, which have the highest skill intensities. Hence, trade liberalization increases the relative demand for skill, analogous to the effect of skill-biased technological change. This prediction receives empirical support in Bloom et. al. (2009). We are not the first to observe the potentially important interaction between skill-biased technology, international trade, and inequality; see e.g. Acemoglu (2003) and Yeaple (2005).

Our paper contributes to this literature by including both trade and MP, nesting the within and between effects, and quantitatively assessing the strength of these effects.

In Section 4 we incorporate multinational production into our model. MP reduces the technological gap between producers in different countries; i.e. it increases the relative importance of factor endowment differences in shaping patterns of specialization. With Hicks-neutral technology, this strengthens the between effect of globalization on the skill premium. With skill-biased technology, we show that a reduction in MP costs between two symmetric countries leads to an increase in the skill premium in both countries because producers that engage in MP tend to be the most productive (and, thus, the most skill intensive). Previous theoretical work that finds an impact of MP on inequality requires that countries differ in their factor-endowment ratios and/or their TFPs. The contribution of our finding is that we obtain a positive effect on the skill premium of MP even between countries with similar endowment ratios and TFPs, which in the data account

\footnote{See also the work of Matsuyama (2007), Zeira (2007), Helpman et. al. (2008), Vannoorenberghe (2008), and Costinot and Vogel (2009).}

\footnote{See e.g. Feenstra and Hanson (1996) and (1997), Zhu and Trefler (2005), Antras et. al. (2006), Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), and Costinot and Vogel (2009).}
for the vast majority of MP.4

In establishing our analytic results, we make strong assumptions. In Sections 5-7, we use a parameterized version of our model that relaxes many of these assumptions to numerically confirm our analytic findings and to provide a quantitative analysis of the impact of globalization on the skill premium. We consider a three-country version of our model, with two symmetric skill-abundant countries and one skill-scarce country, calibrated to match salient features of the extent and composition of U.S. trade and MP with skill-abundant and skill-scarce countries.

In our baseline parameterization, the within effect is relatively strong compared to the between effect. The between effect is weak because we require large technological heterogeneity across producers within sectors in order to account for the fact that the share of U.S. imports from skill-abundant countries in the most skill-intensive sectors is not that much higher than in the least skill-intensive sectors. Because of the relative strength of the within effect, we find that increasing the extent of globalization raises the skill premium in both the skill-abundant and the skill-scarce countries. For example, when we consider a reduction in trade and MP costs to account for the three-fold increase in the U.S. trade share of output between 1963 and 2006, the rise in the skill premium ranges between 4.2% and 6.1% in the skill-abundant countries and between 5% and 5.9% in the skill-scarce country, depending on the growth of MP relative to trade. To put these numbers into perspective, the U.S. College-High School wage gap rose by 26% between 1963 and 2005; see e.g. Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008).

We conduct a range of counterfactuals to investigate the following questions. First, we ask: Does the skill abundance of a country’s trade and MP partners have a quantitatively significant impact on its skill premium? We find that it does not, given the weak between effect at current levels of globalization. Second, we ask: Would further reductions in trade and MP costs have similar implications for the skill premium as previous reductions? We find that they might not, because the between effect becomes stronger at lower MP costs. Third, we ask: What is the relative importance of trade and MP in determining the impact of globalization on the skill premium? We find that both are of similar quantitative importance.

While our model is built to examine the implications of globalization on the skill premium, in Section 6 we show that it also sheds light on a range of additional observations in the data. First, our model predicts that trade is more prevalent in skill-intensive sectors. We find support for this implication in the U.S. data. Second, in our model globalization can generate a simultaneous rise in the skill premium and a decline in the relative price of skill-intensive sectors. Third, we show that our framework can generate a larger increase in the skill premium and less between-sector labor reallocation than a model without technological heterogeneity across producers. The second and third implications above address critiques of the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model in accounting for

4See e.g. Navaretti and Venables (2004) for evidence that most FDI flows take place between advanced countries, which typically have similar, high skill endowment ratios and TFPs.
the rise of the skill premium; see e.g. Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007). Finally, we also show that a standard procedure to estimate the factor content of trade—which is used to infer the impact of trade on inequality; see e.g. Katz and Murphy (1992)—is not very accurate in our model.

While our framework captures two important forces in the debate on globalization and the skill premium—the between and within effects—and incorporates both trade and MP, it abstracts from other interesting and potentially important considerations. For example, our model abstracts from additional factors of production (such as land, other natural resources, and capital) in order to focus on the impact of globalization on the skill premium. Including resources such as oil and rubber would make factor endowments more important for determining trade patterns (because the endowment ratio differences for these factors are more extreme); however, it is not clear what would be the impact on the relative strength of the between and within effects. Additionally, our framework does not incorporate changes in the supply of skilled and unskilled labor, skill-biased technical change, product or process innovation, and capital accumulation with capital-skill complementarity. Our analysis also abstracts from unemployment and within-group inequality. Finally, our model abstracts from non-homothetic preferences, which can lead to differences between changes in the nominal and the real skill premia.

2 Basic Model of International Trade

Our model economy features $I$ countries indexed by $i = 1, ..., I$. Aggregate quantities of inelastically supplied unskilled and skilled labor in country $i$ are $L_i$ and $H_i$, respectively. Each country produces a final non-tradeable good using a continuum of intermediate goods that can be traded subject to an iceberg cost. Intermediate goods are grouped into $J$ sectors, indexed by $j$, in order of increasing skill intensity of production. Within each sector $j$ there are a continuum of subsectors, indexed by $\omega \in [0, 1]$. Within each subsector, intermediate good producers from the same country share the same level of productivity. Productivity varies across subsectors, sectors, and countries. Goods markets and factor markets are perfectly competitive, and factors are perfectly mobile across sectors but are immobile across countries. We assume that countries have balanced trade every period. Given that equilibrium allocations and prices are determined in a static fashion, we abstract from time subscripts.

The final non-tradeable good, denoted by $Q_i$, is produced in all countries by competitive producers that use an identical CES aggregator, which places equal weight on intermediate goods from

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5 See e.g. Grossman and Helpman (1991), Acemoglu (2003), Atkeson and Burstein (2009), and Krusell et. al. (2000), respectively.

6 See e.g., Davidson et. al. (1988) and Helpman et. al. (2008), respectively.

7 See e.g. Broda and Romalis (2009) for an empirical investigation of this issue.
all sectors and subsectors

\[ Q_i = \left( \sum_{j=1}^{J} Q_i(j)^{(\eta'-1)/\eta'} \right)^{\eta'/(\eta'-1)} \]

\[ Q_i(j) = \left( \int_0^1 q_i(\omega,j)^{\eta'(1-1)/\eta} \, d\omega \right)^{\eta/(\eta-1)} . \]

Here, \( Q_i(j) \) and \( q_i(\omega,j) \) denote country \( i \)’s use of the sector \( j \) aggregate good and the subsector \( (\omega,j) \) good, respectively; and \( \eta', \eta > 0 \) are the elasticities of substitution between sectors and between subsectors, respectively.

Facing prices \( P_i, P_i(j) \) and \( p_i(\omega,j) \) for the final non-traded good, the aggregate sector \( j \) good, and the subsector \( (\omega,j) \) good, respectively, profit maximization by the final good producers gives rise to the following demands

\[ Q_i(j) = \left( \frac{P_i(j)}{P_i} \right)^{-\eta'} Q_i \]

\[ q_i(\omega,j) = \left( \frac{p_i(\omega,j)}{P_i(j)} \right)^{-\eta} Q_i(j) . \]

The output of each subsector is produced by intermediate good producers. Goods within each subsector are perfect substitutes and potentially produced by every country. The final good producer purchases each intermediate good from the lowest cost source of that good in the world.

Our assumptions on the production of intermediate goods are as follows. A country \( i \) producer in subsector \( (\omega,j) \) hiring \( h \) units of skilled labor and \( l \) units of unskilled labor, produces output \( y \) according to a constant returns to scale production function

\[ y = A_i(j)^{1/\rho} \left( z^{2(1-\varphi)} h \right)^{(\rho-1)/\rho} + (1 - \alpha_j)^{1/\rho} \left( z^{2(1-\varphi)} l \right)^{(\rho-1)/\rho} \right)^{\rho/(\rho-1)} , \]

where \( \rho > 0 \) is the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers at the level of an individual producer, \( \alpha_j \in [0,1] \) determines the relative importance of skilled labor in sector \( j \), \( \varphi \in [0,1] \) determines the skill bias of technology (as described below), \( A_i(j) > 0 \) is country \( i \)’s Hicks-neutral productivity in sector \( j \), and \( z \) is the producer’s idiosyncratic component of productivity. We abstract from input/output linkages in the production of intermediate goods.\(^8\)

Note that if \( \varphi = 1/2 \), then Equation (1) simplifies to a standard CES production function with multiplicative productivity \( A_i(j) z \). If \( \varphi \neq 1/2 \) and \( \rho \neq 1 \), then technology is not multiplicative. In general, facing wages of unskilled and skilled labor \( w \) and \( s \) respectively, a cost minimizing producer

\( ^8 \)In our quantitative analysis, we have considered (but we do not report) a specification of our model in which production of intermediate goods requires the use of both labor and the final good aggregator. This does not substantially alter our quantitative results.
with productivity $z$ in sector $j$ chooses the following ratio of skilled-to-unskilled labor

$$\frac{h}{l} = \frac{\alpha_j}{1 - \alpha_j} \left( \frac{w}{s} \right)^\rho z^\varphi,$$

where $\varphi \equiv 2(2\bar{\varphi} - 1)(\rho - 1)$ is the skill-bias of technology, which determines the effect of a producer’s productivity on its relative demand for skill. We say that technology is Hicks-neutral if $\varphi = 0$ (i.e. if $\bar{\varphi} = 1/2$ or $\rho = 1$), so that $h/l$ is independent of $z$. In contrast, we say that technology is skill biased if $\varphi > 0$ (i.e. if $\bar{\varphi} > 1/2$ and $\rho > 1$ or if $\bar{\varphi} < 1/2$ and $\rho < 1$), so that $h/l$ increases with $z$.

Each country $i$ draws a subsector-specific idiosyncratic component of productivity $z_i(\omega, j) > 0$, henceforth denoted $z$ when the dependence on $i$ and $(\omega, j)$ is clear. Within a given country, producers in each subsector have access to a common $z$. We model subsector-specific productivity draws as in Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Alvarez and Lucas (2007). In an arbitrary subsector and country $z = u^{-\theta}$, where $u$ is an i.i.d. random variable that is exponentially distributed with mean and variance 1 in all countries. The parameter $\theta > 0$ determines the dispersion of productivity across subsectors.\(^9\) Note that while the subsector-specific component of productivity $z$ is i.i.d. across subsectors, sectors, and countries, the sectoral component of productivity $A_i(j)$ can potentially be systematically correlated with a sector’s skill intensity and a country’s factor endowment.

We introduce trade barriers using iceberg transportation costs: delivering a unit of intermediate good from country $i$ to country $n$ requires producing $\tau_{ni} \geq 1$ units in $i$, where $\tau_{ii} = 1$ for all $i$ and $\tau_{ni} \leq \tau_{nk}\tau_{ki}$ for all $n, i, k \in I$. Denote by $c_{ni}(\omega, j)$ the unit cost of intermediate good producers in subsector $(\omega, j)$ producing in country $i$ and selling in country $n$, which is given by

$$c_{ni}(\omega, j) = \frac{\tau_{ni}}{A_i(j)} \left[ \alpha_j z^{s_i^1 - \rho} + (1 - \alpha_j) z^{s_i^1 - \frac{\rho}{2}} w_i^1 \right]^{1/(1 - \rho)}.$$

With $\bar{\varphi} = 1/2$ so that technology is Hicks-neutral, the unit cost of a given subsector $(\omega, j)$ can be written as the cost of the factor bundle for all subsectors in sector $j$, $v_i(j)$, divided by the subsector-specific productivity. Namely, $c_{ni}(\omega, j) = \tau_{ni} v_i(j) / z$, where $v_i(j)$ is defined as

$$v_i(j) = \frac{1}{A_i(j)} \left[ \alpha_j s_i^1 - \rho + (1 - \alpha_j) w_i^1 \right]^{1/(1 - \rho)}.$$

This case corresponds to the EK setup with a factor bundle that combines skilled and unskilled labor.

\(^9\)As in EK, we must constrain $\eta$ and $\theta$ to have a well-defined price index. In the skill-biased case, however, we cannot derive an analytic expression for this constraint. In all simulations, we check numerically that the price level is well defined.
With perfect competition, the price of the subsector \((\omega, j)\) good in country \(i\) is

\[ p_i (\omega, j) = \min \{ c_{ik} (\omega, j) \} \]

and the aggregate prices \(P_i\) and \(P_i (j)\) are

\[ P_i = \left( \sum_{j=1}^{J} P_i (j)^{1-\eta} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}} \]

\[ P_i (j) = \left( \int_{0}^{1} p_i (\omega, j)^{1-\eta} d\omega \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}}. \]

The total quantity produced of each intermediate good in country \(i\) must equalize its world demand

\[ y_i (\omega, j) = \sum_{n=1}^{I} \tau_{ni} q_{ni} (\omega, j) \mathbb{I}_{ni} (\omega, j) \]

where \(\mathbb{I}_{ni} (\omega, j)\) is an indicator function that equals one if country \(n\) imports subsector \((\omega, j)\) goods from country \(i\).

The amount of skilled and unskilled labor demanded by subsector \((\omega, j)\) in country \(i\) are denoted by \(h_i (\omega, j)\) and \(l_i (\omega, j)\), respectively. Labor market clearing in each country requires

\[ L_i = \sum_{j=1}^{J} \int_{0}^{1} l_i (\omega, j) d\omega, \quad \text{and} \]

\[ H_i = \sum_{j=1}^{J} \int_{0}^{1} h_i (\omega, j) d\omega. \]

We assume that countries spend all of their income on the final non-traded good, which implies trade balance:

\[ P_i Q_i = s_i H_i + w_i L_i. \]

An equilibrium of the world economy is a set of aggregate prices \([P_i, w_i, s_i]_{i \in I}\), aggregate quantities \([Q_i]_{i \in I}\), sector and subsector prices \([P_i (j)]_{i \in I, j \in J}\) and \([p_i (\omega, j)]_{\omega \in [0,1], i \in I, j \in J}\), sector and subsector quantities \([Q_i (j)]_{i \in I, j \in J}\) and \([q_i (\omega, j), y_i (\omega, j)]_{\omega \in [0,1], i \in I, j \in J}\) demanded and produced, and factor demands \([l_i (\omega, j), h_i (\omega, j)]_{\omega \in [0,1], i \in I, j \in J}\) that satisfy final and intermediate goods producers' optimality conditions, factor and goods market clearing conditions, and trade balance in each country.
3 International Trade and the Skill Premium

In this section, we conduct comparative statics on the skill premium in our basic model of international trade under two sets of simplifying assumptions. Appendix A provides a characterization of equilibrium under both sets of assumptions while Appendix B provides proofs of all lemmas and propositions. In our quantitative analysis we relax all of these assumptions. Our goal is to provide intuition for the key mechanisms operating in our framework. We focus, in particular, on two central interactions: those between technological heterogeneity and factor endowment differences, in Subsection 3.1, and those between technological heterogeneity and skill-biased technology, in Subsection 3.2. In both subsections we focus on a two-country, two-sector, two-factor world, as in the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model. In particular, we maintain the following simplifying assumption.

A1 There are two countries, $I = \{1, 2\}$; there are two sectors, $J = \{x, y\}$ with sector $x$ relatively skill intensive, $\alpha_y < \alpha_x$; trade costs are symmetric, $\tau \equiv \tau_{12} = \tau_{21}$; and the elasticity of substitution between sectors is one, $\eta' = 1$.

Note that with $\eta' = 1$, the expenditure share of each sector is $1/2$ in each country.

3.1 Hicks-Neutral Technologies and Endowment Differences

In this subsection, we conduct comparative statics exercises on the skill premium under Assumption A1 and the following assumption:

A2 Production functions are Cobb Douglas, $\rho = 1$ in Equation (1), and $\bar{\varphi} = 1/2$.

With Cobb-Douglas production functions, skilled labor’s share of revenue in sector $j$ is equal to $\alpha_j$. With either $\rho = 1$ or $\bar{\varphi} = 1/2$, technology is Hicks-neutral, $\varphi = 0$. We assume that $\bar{\varphi} = 1/2$ so that the efficiency of a producer with productivity $z$ in sector $j$ is $A_i(j) z$ as in standard models such as EK.

With Hicks-neutral technology, we obtain simple sector-level gravity equations, as in EK. The value of country $i$’s production for country $n$ in sector $j$ is given by $\pi_{ni}(j) Q_n P_n/2$, where $\pi_{ni}(j)$ denotes country $i$’s revenue share of sector $j$ in country $n$ and $Q_n P_n/2$ is country $n$’s expenditure on sector $j$. With exponential productivity draws, $\pi_{ni}(j)$ is also the fraction of subsectors in sector $j$ that country $i$ provides in country $n$. Exploiting the convenient properties of the exponential distribution and Hicks-neutral technology, we obtain closed-form solutions for $\pi_{ni}(j)$ for all $n, i \in I$, given by

$$
\pi_{ni}(j) = \frac{[\tau_{ni} v_i(j)]^{-1/\theta}}{v_n(j)^{-1/\theta} + [\tau_{n-n} v_n(j)]^{-1/\theta}}.
$$

(6)
Under Assumptions A1 and A2, the skill premium in country $i$ equals

$$s_i = \frac{L_i}{H_i} \frac{\sum_{j=x,y} \alpha_j [\pi_{-ii} (j) Q_{-i} P_{-i} + \pi_{ii} (j) Q_i P_i]}{\sum_{j=x,y} (1 - \alpha_j) [\pi_{-ii} (j) Q_{-i} P_{-i} + \pi_{ii} (j) Q_i P_i]}$$

(7)

which follows from the characterization of the equilibrium in Appendix A. Country $i$’s skill premium depends on its endowment ratio, $H_i/L_i$; the skill intensities of the sectors, $\alpha_x$ and $\alpha_y$; the ratio of countries’ expenditures, $Q_1 P_1/Q_2 P_2$; and all the $\pi_{ni} (j)$’s. However, we show in the following Lemma that the expenditure ratio and the $\pi$’s are pinned down by a small set of variables. In particular, denote by $\Delta_i = \frac{1}{2} [\pi_{i-i} (x) + \pi_{i-i} (y)]$ country $i$’s expenditure share of trade and by $\Delta_3 = \pi_{12} (y) - \pi_{12} (x)$ the difference in import shares between sector $x$ and sector $y$ in country 1. Then:

**Lemma 1** In any equilibrium, the $\pi_{ni} (j)$’s and relative national expenditure, $Q_1 P_1/Q_2 P_2$, are uniquely determined by $\alpha_x$, $\alpha_y$, $\Delta_1$, $\Delta_2$, and $\Delta_3$.

A straightforward implication of Lemma 1 is that the skill premium $s_i/w_i$ is pinned down by $\alpha_x$, $\alpha_y$, $\Delta_1$, $\Delta_2$, $\Delta_3$, and factor endowments. We use Lemma 1 to prove Propositions 1 and 2 below.

In what follows, we say that country 1 has a comparative advantage in sector $x$ if and only if its import share in sector $x$ is lower than its import share in sector $y$ for any positive trade share (i.e. $\Delta_3 > 0$ for any $\Delta_1, \Delta_2 > 0$). Note that the higher is $\Delta_3$ in absolute value, the more specialized are a country’s exports in its comparative advantage sector. We thus refer to $\Delta_3$ as the extent of sectoral specialization in a country. Without loss of generality, we assume that country 1 has a comparative advantage in sector $x$ throughout this section. A sufficient condition under which $\Delta_3 > 0$ for any positive trade share is $H_1/L_1 > H_2/L_2$ and $a \equiv A_1 (x) A_2 (y) / A_1 (y) A_2 (x) \geq 1$, where $a$ summarizes the extent to which country 1 is relatively more productive in sector $x$.

Starting in autarky, a reduction in trade costs leads to reallocation of factors between sectors towards a country’s comparative advantage sector. This increases the relative demand and, therefore, the relative price of the factor that is used intensively in the comparative advantage sector. We refer to this force as the *between effect* of globalization on the skill premium. This result is summarized in the following Proposition.

**Proposition 1** Suppose Assumptions A1 and A2 hold. Reducing trade costs from autarky, $\Delta_1, \Delta_2 = 0$, to any positive level of trade, $\Delta_1, \Delta_2 > 0$, with $\Delta_3 > 0$ increases $s_1/w_1$ and decreases $s_2/w_2$. If $\Delta_3 < 0$, then the skill premiums move in the opposite direction.

When there are no productivity differences between sectors and subsectors, our model is similar to the Heckscher-Ohlin model, in which the location of production of each subsector is determined solely by trade costs and factor endowments. In this case, Proposition 1 captures the standard Stolper-Samuelson effect.
However, in our model a given subsector’s location of production is determined by trade costs, systematic components of comparative advantage (factor endowments and sectoral productivities), and within-sector idiosyncratic productivity differences. A higher dispersion of productivities within sectors, \( \theta \), increases the relative importance of the idiosyncratic component of comparative advantage. In particular, according to Equation (6) we have
\[
\frac{\partial}{\partial \pi_{ii}}(j) > 0 \text{ if and only if } \tau v_{i}(j) > v_{-i}(j),
\]
so that as \( \theta \) increases, country \( i \)'s share of sales in country \( -i \) increase in \( i \)'s comparative disadvantage sector and decrease in \( i \)'s comparative advantage sector. Hence, the higher is \( \theta \) the less a country specializes in its comparative advantage sector. On the other hand, a higher value of \( a \) (when \( \Delta_3 > 0 \)) increases the relative importance of the systematic component of comparative advantage. In particular when \( \Delta_3 > 0 \), we have
\[
\frac{\partial}{\partial a}(j) > 0 \text{ if and only if } j \text{ is country } i \text{'s comparative advantage sector, so that as } a \text{ increases, country } i \text{'s share of sales in country } -i \text{ increase in } i \text{'s comparative advantage sector and decrease in } i \text{'s comparative disadvantage sector.}
\]
This logic leads to the following Proposition, which states that a lower \( a \) (when \( \Delta_3 > 0 \)) and a higher \( \theta \) mitigate the between effect of going from autarky to any fixed and positive trade shares.

**Proposition 2** Suppose Assumptions A1 and A2 hold and that country 1 has a comparative advantage in sector \( x \).

1. If \( \tau \) and \( A_i(j) \) for all \( i \) and \( j \) are chosen to match fixed values of \( a \) and \( \Delta_1, \Delta_2 > 0 \), then the increase in the skill premium in country 1 and the decrease in the skill premium in country 2 caused by moving from autarky to these trade shares is decreasing in \( \theta \).

2. If \( \tau \) and \( A_i(j) \) for all \( i \) and \( j \) are chosen to match fixed values of \( \theta \) and \( \Delta_1, \Delta_2 > 0 \), then the increase in the skill premium in country 1 and the decrease in the skill premium in country 2 caused by moving from autarky to these trade shares is increasing in \( a \).

The proof of Proposition 2 consists of three parts. Here we outline the proof of the comparative static with respect to \( \theta \); a similar logic applies to the comparative static with respect to \( a \). First, if trade costs are prohibitively high, then with Hicks-neutral technology \( \theta \) has no impact on factor allocation and factor prices. Second, for fixed and positive trade shares \( \Delta_1, \Delta_2 > 0 \), a higher \( \Delta_3 \) strengthens the between effect. Third, for fixed and positive trade shares \( \Delta_1, \Delta_2 > 0 \), a higher \( \theta \) leads to less specialization of production across sectors (a lower \( \Delta_3 \)) and more specialization across subsectors within sectors. With Hicks-neutral technology, within-sector specialization does not impact the relative demand for skill or the skill premium in either country. Combining these three parts of the proof, we obtain the result that going from autarky to fixed and positive trade shares, a higher \( \theta \) mitigates the between effect.

\[ ^{10} \text{On the other hand if country 2 has a comparative advantage in sector } x, \text{ then the decrease in the skill premium in country 1 and the increase in the skill premium in country 2 caused by moving from autarky to } \Delta_1, \Delta_2 > 0 \text{ is increasing in } \theta \text{ (decreasing in } a). \]

\[ ^{11} \text{In Proposition 2 we hold trade shares constant, rather than holding trade costs constant, while varying } \theta \text{ and } a \text{ for two reasons. First, as we increase } \theta \text{ holding trade costs constant, the impact on the the skill premium is ambiguous} \]
Proposition 2 provides comparative statics results on the impact of key parameters on the strength of the between effect. However, using Lemma 1 we can show that the percentage change in the skill premium of moving from autarky to any positive trade shares is fully pinned down by only $\alpha_x$ and $\alpha_y$; country 1 and country 2’s expenditure shares of trade, $\Delta_1$ and $\Delta_2$; and the difference in import shares between sector $x$ and sector $y$ in country 1, $\Delta_3$.\textsuperscript{12} In particular, conditional on keeping these variables fixed, the percentage change in the skill premium is independent of our particular choice of factor endowments ($H_i, L_i$), $\theta$, and $a$. This logic guides our choice of targets when quantifying the strength of the between effect in Section 5.

Finally, Lemma 1 and Propositions 1 and 2 are robust across a range of workhorse models, although the interpretation of the parameters may differ across models. In particular, these results hold in any two-factor model satisfying the following three properties: (i) sector-level gravity equations take the form of $\pi_{ni}(j)$ in Equation (6) multiplied by country $n$’s expenditure on sector $j$; (ii) factor shares in total revenues are constant; and (iii) expenditure shares by sector are constant. Under these three conditions, the system of equations that determine wages are identical to those in our model. For example, these assumptions are satisfied in a two-factor version of Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum’s (2003) Ricardian model with Bertrand competition in which producers engage in limit pricing. In such a model, the $\pi$’s are exactly the same as in our model and although there are positive markups, factors receive a constant share of receive. Moreover, these assumptions are also satisfied in a model with monopolistic competition and differentiated goods in which all firms export, à la Krugman (1980) or Romalis (2004), under the additional assumption that the number of producers per sector is exogenously fixed. In such a model, our dispersion parameter $\theta$ in Equation (6) is replaced by $1/(\sigma - 1)$, where $\sigma$ is the elasticity of substitution across country-specific varieties within a sector. In this case, a lower $\sigma$ decreases the elasticity of sectoral trade with respect to the cost of the composite input bundle, which weakens the between effect; this is analogous to an increase in $\theta$ in our model.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{12}One can show that $\alpha_x$, $\alpha_y$, $\Delta_1$, $\Delta_2$, and $\Delta_3$ pin down the factor content of trade, which determines the change in the skill premium caused by reductions in trade costs. This is related to Deardorff and Staiger (1988).

\textsuperscript{13}One could extend our work to incorporate endogenous innovation and entry. These margins could yield endogenous changes in sectoral productivities resulting from reductions in trade costs, which could strengthen or weaken the between effect. One example of such an extension—in a model with differentiated goods, monopolistic competition, and endogenous entry—is Bernard et. al. (2007). They show that reductions in trade costs induce a larger increase in average productivity in a country’s comparative advantage sector. However, in spite of this effect, they show in a numerical example that the increase in the skill premium in a skill-abundant country from reductions in trade costs is smaller in such a model than in a model in which all firms export, à la Helpman and Krugman (1985).
3.2 Skill-Biased Technologies and Symmetric Countries

In this subsection, we conduct comparative statics exercises on the skill premium under Assumption A1 and the following assumption.

A3 The sector-level aggregator is Cobb Douglas, $\eta = 1$; technology is skilled biased, $\phi > 0$; and countries have equal endowments and TFPs, $H_1 = H_2$, $L_1 = L_2$, and $A_1(j) = A_2(j) = 1$ for $j = x, y$.

With symmetric countries (i.e. equal factor endowments and TFPs), factor prices are equalized across countries, $s = s_1 = s_2$ and $w = w_1 = w_2$. The assumption that $\eta = 1$ simplifies the algebra, as discussed in Appendix A.2. With skill-biased technology, we cannot solve explicitly for $\pi_{ij}$; however, we are able to obtain analytic results without this explicit solution. Because we do not require a closed-form solution for $\pi_{ij}$, our results in this subsection do not make use of the assumption that costs are distributed exponentially. We characterize equilibrium under Assumptions A1 and A3 in Appendix A.

If countries are symmetric and technology is Hicks-neutral, $\phi = 0$, then reductions in the cost of trade do not affect the skill premium. On the other hand, if technology is skill biased, $\phi > 0$, then reductions in the cost of trade increase the skill premium. The intuition behind this result is as follows. As in standard heterogeneous firm models, reductions in trade costs induce a reallocation of factors of production within sectors towards relatively productive producers. With skill-biased technology, relatively productive producers are also relatively skill intensive; see Equation (2). Hence, trade liberalization increases the relative demand for skill and the skill premium. This result is summarized in Proposition 3.

**Proposition 3** If Assumptions A1 and A3 hold, then $s/w$ is strictly decreasing in $\tau$.

In Proposition 3, we have assumed that countries are symmetric. The results in Propositions 1 and 3 suggest that with asymmetric countries, the between effect and the within effect both lead to an increase in the skill premium in skill-abundant countries in response to a reduction in trade costs. On the other hand, they push in opposite directions in skill-scarce countries. According to Proposition 2, the greater is idiosyncratic productivity dispersion, the weaker is the between effect, and hence the more likely that the skill premium also rises in skill-scarce countries. Which force dominates and by how much is a quantitative question that we address in our quantitative analysis.

4 MP and the Skill Premium

In this section, we extend our model by incorporating multinational production (MP) and conduct comparative statics exercises on the skill premium. We model MP as enabling intermediate good
producers to use their technologies in foreign countries. Producers choosing to engage in MP incur a per-unit cost. In particular, country $k$ producers in subsector $(\omega, j)$ that operate in country $i$ incur a per-unit cost of MP given by $\mu_{ki} \times m_{ki}(\omega, j)$. The country-level per-unit cost of MP, $\mu_{ki} \geq 1$, is analogous to the per-unit cost of exporting; we assume $\mu_{ii} = 1$ and $\mu_{ki} \geq 1$ for all $k, i \in I$. We introduce a country/subsector-specific efficiency loss of MP, $m_{ki}(\omega, j)$, in order to obtain an interior equilibrium for the subsectors that engage in MP versus exports; if we did not include this idiosyncratic MP cost, then either no producers in a sector would engage in MP or no producers in a sector would export.

Goods in subsector $(\omega, j)$ can be supplied to country $n$ in four ways. Production can take place in either country 1 or country 2; and production can use productivity from either country 1 or country 2. We denote by $c_{ni}(\omega, j)$ the per-unit cost of supplying $(\omega, j)$ to country $n$ by producing in country $i$ using country $k$’s productivity

$$c_{ni}^k(\omega, j) = \frac{\mu_{ki}m_{ki}\tau_{ni}}{A_k(j)} \left[ \alpha_j z_k^{1-\rho} s_i^{1-\rho} + (1 - \alpha_j) z_k^{1-\rho} w_i^{1-\rho} \right]^{1/(1-\rho)}$$

where we omit the dependence of $m_{ki}$ and $z_k$ on $(\omega, j)$. Note that if country $k$ producers locate in country $i$, then they use their own productivity $z_k$ and TFP $A_k(j)$, but they use country $i$ labor and hence incur country $i$’s labor costs, $s_i$ and $w_i$. Producers from country 1 may locate in country 2 either (i) to sell in country 2’s domestic market—to avoid incurring trade costs and/or to exploit low factor prices in country 2—or (ii) to export the goods back to country 1—to exploit low factor prices in country 2. For simplicity, we consider the case with two countries and symmetric country-level MP costs in what follows (we drop this assumption in the quantitative analysis).

As before, we conduct comparative statics exercises under two different sets of simplifying assumptions to obtain analytic solutions.

**Hicks-neutral technology and endowment differences:** We first consider the specification of our model with $\bar{\varphi} = 1/2$ so that technology is Hicks-neutral. In this case, the cost of the factor bundle can be disentangled from the productivity $z$, so that the cost $c_{ni}^k(\omega, j)$ can be expressed as

$$c_{ni}^k(\omega, j) = \frac{v_i(j)}{z_k(\omega, j)} A_k(j)^{\tau_{ni}\mu_{ki}}m_{ki}(\omega, j)$$

The cost of supplying country 1 is (i) $v_1/z_1$ if production is carried-out in country 1 using country 1’s productivity; (ii) $\tau v_2/z_2$ if production is carried-out in country 2 using country 2’s productivity and output is exported to country 1; (iii) $\mu m_{21} v_1 A_1/A_2 z_2$ if production is carried-out in country 1 via MP (using country 2’s productivity); and, (iv) $\mu m_{12} v_2 A_2/A_1 z_1$ if production is carried-out in country 2 via MP and output is exported to country 1. Each good is supplied by the lowest cost of the four alternatives, which is determined by factor prices, productivity draws, trade costs, and MP costs.
We now derive analytic results on the impact of changes in MP costs on the skill premium under assumptions A1 and A2. We solve for our model as in Subsection 3.1, where $\pi_{ni}(j)$ is now the fraction of subsectors in sector $j$ that are supplied in country $n$ by producers located in country $i$, defined as

$$
\pi_{ni}(j) = \Pr \left[ \min_{k=1,2} \left\{ c_{n_i}^k(j) \right\} \leq \min_{k=1,2} \left\{ c_{n-i}^k(j) \right\} \right].
$$

(8)

With Hicks-neutral technology, MP does not affect the relative demand for skill within a sector at fixed factor costs; in this case it can only affect the between-sector allocation of factors. However, with no international trade, MP does not affect the between-sector allocation of factors because a reduction in $\mu$ has the same impact on $\pi_{ni}(x)$ as on $\pi_{ni}(y)$. This follows from the fact that $\pi_{ni}(x)$ and $\pi_{ni}(y)$ in (8) are both independent of factor prices when there is no trade. Combining these two implications, we obtain the result that the cost of MP has no impact on the skill premium in the absence of international trade.

As the cost of MP decreases, the expected technological gap across locations decreases. With international trade, this increases the importance of factor endowment differences in determining the pattern of specialization. Hence, as $\mu$ and $m_{ki}$ decline, a country moves towards specializing in its comparative advantage sector, as in the model with no technological dispersion ($\theta \to 0$). In fact, under Assumptions A1 and A2, the skill premium with costless MP is equivalent to the skill premium with no technological dispersion.

Proposition 4 summarizes these two results.

**Proposition 4** Suppose Assumptions A1 and A2 hold and that $A_1(j) = A_2(j)$ for $j = x, y$. Then

1. $\lim_{\tau \to \infty} (s_l/w_i) = 0$ is independent of $\mu$ for $i = 1, 2$; and

2. $\lim_{\mu m_{ki}(\omega,j) \to 1} \nu(\omega,j)_k \frac{a_l}{w_l} = \lim_{\theta \to 0} \frac{a_l}{w_l}$ for $l = 1, 2$.

The central implication of Proposition 4 is that a lower MP cost strengthens the between effect by making the systematic components of comparative advantage more important in determining patterns of specialization. That is, reductions in trade costs have a larger effect on the skill premium in both countries in the presence of costless MP. We return to this in our quantitative analysis.\(^{14}\)

**Skill-biased technology and symmetric countries**: We now consider the impact of MP on the skill-premium in the specification of our model with skill-biased technology and two symmetric countries.

\(^{14}\)In our analytics we abstract from another mechanism studied in Feenstra and Hanson (1996), Zhu and Trefler (2005), and Costinot and Vogel (2009) by which MP transfers superior technology to the low-TPF and skill-scarce country, increasing the effective size of this country, and thereby strengthening (weakening) the between effect in skill-abundant (skill-scarce) countries. This increases the skill premium everywhere. This mechanism is also present in our framework, but here we turn it off by assuming $A_1 = A_2$.\(^{14}\)
A reduction in the cost of MP—from a level at which there is a positive volume of MP, $\mu < \tau$—increases the skill premium. If $\mu < \tau$, then a reduction in MP costs increases the fraction of subsectors in a country that produce using foreign productivity. If a domestic subsector produces using foreign productivity, producers in the foreign subsector must be more productive than those in the domestic one. Hence, a reduction in MP costs weakly increases the productivity of all subsectors and strictly increases the productivity of some subsectors. With skill-biased technology, relatively productive subsectors are also relatively skill intensive. Hence, reductions in the cost of MP increase the relative demand for skill and the relative skilled wage. Proposition 5 summarizes this result.

**Proposition 5** If Assumptions A1 and A3 hold and $\mu < \tau$, then $s/w$ is strictly decreasing in $\mu$.

Note that Proposition 5 holds even in the absence of positive trade flows. This is in contrast to the case of Hicks-neutral technology, in which MP does not impact the skill premium in the absence of trade.\(^{15}\)

## 5 Quantitative Analysis: Baseline Parameterization

In this section, we study the quantitative implications of globalization on the skill premium in a parameterized version of our model that we cannot fully solve analytically. We first introduce additional assumptions that we use in our quantitative model. We then calibrate our model to match salient features of the data on U.S. trade and MP with other developed and developing countries and present our baseline results on the implications of globalization on the skill premium. We also examine the role of our two central parameters, $\theta$ and $\varphi$, in our calibration.

### 5.1 Quantitative Model

Here we describe additional assumptions that we use in our quantitative analysis. First, to account for manufacturing’s relatively small share of total output in many countries, we assume that the final good in country $i$ is produced according to $(Q_i)^\gamma (N_i)^{1-\gamma}$, where $Q_i$ denotes output of the final manufactured good, as modeled in Section 2, and $N_i$ denotes output of the final non-manufactured good.\(^{16}\) We model production of non-manufactured goods exactly as in Section 2, and we assume that labor is perfectly mobile between manufacturing and non-manufacturing. We denote the

\(^{15}\)A similar logic applies to the implications of asymmetric changes in TFPs. For instance, if country 1 has a higher TFP than country 2 (e.g. $A_1 > A_2$), then a marginal increase in country 2’s TFP leads to an increase in the skill premium in country 1. Hence, a country’s MP partner’s TFP plays a role in determining the impact of MP on the skill premium.

\(^{16}\)In our sensitivity analysis, we allowed for a CES aggregator between manufactured and non-manufactured output. Our quantitative results are largely unaffected by varying this elasticity over a wide range of values.
trade costs of manufactured and non-manufactured goods by \( \tau^Q_{ni} \) and \( \tau^N_{ni} \), respectively, and impose symmetric trade costs between pairs of countries, \( \tau^j_{ni} = \tau^j_{in} \) for \( j = Q, N \).

Second, we assume that the country/subsector-specific efficiency loss of MP, \( m_{ni}(\omega, j) \), is given by \( 1 + \tilde{u} \), where \( \tilde{u} \geq 0 \) is an i.i.d. random variable that is exponentially distributed with mean and standard deviation \( \theta_m \). We also assume that the country-level MP cost, \( \mu_{ni} \), is equal for manufactured and non-manufactured goods and is symmetric between pairs of countries, \( \mu_{ni} = \mu_{in} \).

Third, given that our goal is to quantify the impact of globalization on the skill premium with a particular emphasis on the U.S., we consider a world economy that is composed of country 1 (the U.S.), country 2 (an aggregate of other skill-abundant countries), and country 3 (an aggregate of skill-scarce countries). Country 1 and country 2 are ex-ante identical (i.e., in their labor endowments \( H_1 = H_2, L_1 = L_2 \), systematic productivities \( A_1(j) = A_2(j) \), trade costs \( \tau^j_{31} = \tau^j_{32} \) for \( j = Q, N \), and country-level MP costs \( \mu_{32} = \mu_{31} \)), but they differ in their ex-post realizations of country/subsector-specific productivity draws and idiosyncratic MP costs. In this three-country setup, we can match U.S. shares and compositions of trade and MP with skill-abundant and skill-scarce aggregates. We can also investigate whether the rise in the skill premium in the U.S. is accompanied by a rise or fall in the skill premium in the skill-scarce aggregate.

Of course, with an aggregate non-U.S. skill-abundant country and an aggregate skill-scarce country, we do not match the composition of trade and MP for individual countries within these aggregates. Hence, we must be cautious in assessing the model’s predicted implications of globalization on the skill premium in countries other than the U.S. vis-à-vis the data. This would require a world economy with more than three countries. As we increase the number of countries, choosing trade and MP costs to match all bilateral trade and MP flows becomes computationally infeasible.

A common alternative approach in the literature is to choose a parametric relationship between bilateral trade and MP costs and bilateral country characteristics; see e.g. Fieler (2007), Ramondo and Rodriguez-Clare (2009), and Waugh (2009). Implementing this approach is problematic in our framework for two reasons. First, estimating many parameters is very computationally intensive because, with skill-biased technology, \( \pi_{in}(j) \) must be calculated by simulating producer-level data from the model. Second, under this approach we would not exactly match the shares of trade and MP in individual countries, which are essential for determining the strengths of the between and within effects.\(^\text{17}\)

Finally, we assume that the elasticity of substitution between sectors equals the elasticity of substitution between subsectors, \( \eta = \eta' \), and that a country’s systematic productivity is equal across all sectors, \( A_i(j) = A_i \) for all \( j \). The latter is consistent with empirical evidence in Morrow (2008) that productivity differences across industries are uncorrelated with the factor intensities of these industries. Nevertheless, given the logic of Lemma 1, this assumption does not play an

\(^{17}\)A different approach is to use the closed-form solution of \( \pi_{in} \) to substitute out trade costs, so that no stand on trade costs needs to be taken; see e.g. Bernard et. al. 2003. Unfortunately, this approach is not feasible in our framework because no closed-form solution for \( \pi_{in}(j) \) exists.
important role in determining the strength of the between effect.

5.2 Baseline Calibration

The parameters that we must choose are the skill bias of technology, \( \varphi \); the dispersion of productivities, \( \theta \); the dispersion of MP costs, \( \theta_m \); the elasticity of substitution across sectors and subsectors, \( \eta \); the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor at the level of an individual producer, \( \rho \); the share of manufacturing in final output, \( \gamma \); the two TFP levels, \( A_1 \) and \( A_3 \); the labor endowments, \( H_i, L_i \) for \( i = 1, 3 \); the sectoral skill intensities, \( \alpha_j ^{i} \)' s; and the trade and MP costs, \( \tau_{12} ^{j}, \tau_{13} ^{j}, \mu_{12}, \) and \( \mu_{13} \) for \( j = Q, N \). We normalize country 1’s aggregate TFP and supply of unskilled labor, \( A_1 = L_1 = 1 \).

General strategy: Our central objective is to quantify the strength of the between and within effects of globalization on the skill premium. We use our theoretical results to guide our calibration strategy. Consider first the between effect. Lemma 1 implies that the strength of this effect in a two-country, two-sector model with \( \rho = \eta' = 1 \) and no MP is fully determined by the trade shares in each country and \( \Delta_3 = \pi_{12} (y) - \pi_{12} (x) \). It is straightforward to extend this result to a three-country model in which countries 1 and 2 are ex-ante symmetric as in our quantitative model. In this case, the strength of the between effect is determined by the trade shares in each country, the share of imports in country 1 from country 3, and the difference between country 1’s share of imports from country 2 in the skill-intensive sectors and in the unskill-intensive sectors, which in the two-sector model is given by \( \Delta_3^* = \frac{\pi_{12} (y)}{\pi_{12} (y) + \pi_{13} (y)} - \frac{\pi_{12} (x)}{\pi_{12} (x) + \pi_{13} (x)} \). Note that conditional on matching these four moments, the strength of the between effect is independent of the level of the skill premium and the endowments in every country. Motivated by this result, our calibration targets these four moments. We acknowledge, however, that these four moments do not exactly pin down the strength of the between effect in our quantitative model, which relaxes some of the assumptions imposed in our analytic work.

Now consider the within effect. Based on our theoretical results, given trade shares, the strength of this effect is shaped by the difference in skill intensities between exporting and non-exporting producers. We calibrate this difference using information on the elasticity of skill intensity to size and the relative size difference between exporting and non-exporting producers. We construct these statistics in our model under the assumption that an individual subsector is matched to an individual producer. However, this is only one of many possible configurations. With perfect competition and constant returns to scale, the distribution of sales across producers within a subsector is not uniquely determined. We also considered a slightly modified version of our model, in which each producer in a subsector draws a different productivity, and in which producers in each subsector engage in limit pricing (i.e. a two-factor version of Bernard et. al. 2003). In this model, each subsector contains exactly one active producer. Our results, which are available upon request, are essentially unchanged.
We consider two baseline parameterizations, one with only trade and one with both trade and MP. Our preferred baseline parameterization includes both trade and MP. We will use the simpler specification with only trade to isolate the role of key parameters in our model in Subsection 5.3. Table 1 displays the parameter values under our two baseline parameterizations. Table 1 also reports the parameter values under two additional parameterizations in which we impose \( \varphi = 0 \), one with only trade and one with both trade and MP. We use these additional parameterizations in Section 7 to isolate the strength of the between effect and the role of skill-biased technology.

**Specifics of calibration:** We calibrate our model using data for 2006 or the closest years with available information. We first determine the set of skill-abundant and skill-scarce countries that we map to our three-country model economy. Using the educational attainment dataset described in Barro and Lee (2000), we rank countries by their most recent data on the average years of education for the population over age 25. We consider a country to be skill abundant if this average is greater than 6.9 years. According to this cutoff, Mexico is the most skilled of the skill-scarce countries and Italy is the least skilled of the skill-abundant countries. We list the set of skill-abundant and skill-scarce countries according to our cutoff in the Data Appendix.

The endowments of skilled and unskilled labor in each country are chosen as follows. We set the relative endowment of unskilled labor in country 3, \( L_3/L_1 = 5.7 \), so that \( L_3/(2L_1) \) matches the relative population of the skill-scarce countries to the skill-abundant countries in 2006, as reported in the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). We set the ratio of endowment ratios \( (H_1/L_1)/(H_3/L_3) = 0.49 \) to match the population-weighted average of education levels in the skill-abundant countries relative to the unskill-abundant countries.\(^{18}\) Finally, we set \( H_1/L_1 = 0.71 \) as in Acemoglu (2002).

We set the share of manufactured goods in final output, \( \gamma = 0.219 \), to match the share of manufacturing in U.S. total output in 2006, based on the Bureau of Economic Statistics’ (BEA) input-output tables. We assume that there are 100 sectors in each manufacturing and non-manufacturing and that each sector contains 900 subsectors. The sectoral skill intensities, \( \alpha \), are uniformly distributed over the range 0.1 and 0.6 to roughly match the range of skill intensities of manufacturing sectors in the U.S.\(^{19}\) We set the elasticity of substitution across sectors and subsectors, \( \eta = 3 \), to match the median sectoral elasticity in the U.S. estimated by Broda and Weinstein (2006).\(^{20}\)

We choose the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor at the level of an individual producer, \( \rho = 1.2 \), to match the aggregate elasticity of substitution of 1.41 between skilled and unskilled labor estimated by Katz and Murphy (1992), who control for skill-biased technological change using a time trend. In particular, we set \( \rho \) so that, given other parameter

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\(^{18}\)Weights are determined by relative populations in 2006, obtained from the WDI.

\(^{19}\)Our measure of sectoral skill intensity is the sectoral share of non-production worker employment, obtained from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database for 2002.

\(^{20}\)Our choice of \( \eta = 3 \) falls between the median elasticities of substitution based on the HTS and SITC5 classifications for the period 1990-2001, reported in Broda and Weinstein (2006)
values, a change in the relative endowment of skilled labor results in a change in the skill premium that is consistent with that estimated by Katz and Murphy (1992). This procedure yields a value of \( \rho \) that is slightly lower than 1.41 because of inter- and intra-sectoral labor reallocation in response to a change in factor endowments.

We set the dispersion of subsector productivities, \( \theta = 0.25, \) to match the absolute difference between the U.S.’s share of imports in manufacturing from skill-abundant countries in the 50% most skill-intensive sectors and in the 50% least skill-intensive sectors, which is the multi-sector version of \( \Delta^s_5 \) defined above.\(^{21}\) Our value of \( \theta \) falls within the range of \( \theta \)’s estimated by others, although the gravity equations that give rise to these estimates do not apply with skill-biased technology. For example, EK estimate \( \theta \in [0.08, 0.28], \) Donaldson (2008) estimates \( \theta \in [0.14, 0.26], \) Ramondo and Rodriguez-Clare (2009) estimate \( \theta = 0.14, \) and Waugh (2009) estimates \( \theta = 0.18. \) We choose TFP in country 3 relative to country 1, \( A_3, \) to match the overall share of U.S. imports in manufacturing from skill-abundant countries.\(^{22}\) Given that we have assumed that country 3 has a relatively large population, our calibration procedure results in a relatively low TFP for country 3.

We set the degree of skill bias in technology, \( \varphi = 0.37, \) so that the elasticity of skill intensity to sales at the producer level in country 3, controlling for the producer’s sector, is equal to 0.1. This roughly matches the elasticity calculated by Verhoogen (2004) using plant-level data for Mexico in 1998.\(^{23}\) In our first parameterization, we set \( \varphi = 0 \) so that the elasticity of skill intensity to size is zero.

We choose the level of trade costs between the skill-abundant countries, \( \tau_{12}^Q \) and \( \tau_{12}^N, \) and the constant of proportionality that defines the level of trade costs between skill-abundant and unskill-abundant countries, \( \epsilon = \left( \tau_{13}^j - 1 \right) / \left( \tau_{12}^j - 1 \right) \) for \( j = Q \) and \( N, \) to match the three following observations on the volumes of international trade observed in 2006: 

(i) the average of manufactured exports and imports relative to manufactured output in country 1 (the U.S.) is 22.7%;
(ii) the average of non-manufactured exports and imports relative to non-manufactured output in country 1 is 3.3%;\(^{24}\) and
(iii) the average of exports plus imports relative to output in country 3, combining manufacturing and non-manufacturing, is 12%.\(^{25}\) The resulting share of trade in total

\(^{21}\)In particular, we target a difference of 11%, corresponding to the difference in the U.S. in 2006. For this calculation, we created a second measure of skill intensity—the average worker wage in the sector—and dropped all SIC sectors that are in the top 20% of one measure of skill intensity and in the bottom 20% of the other measure. This is a conservative approach: without dropping these sectors the difference would have been much smaller (2%), our value of \( \theta \) would have been larger, and globalization’s impact on inequality would have been greater.

\(^{22}\)The share of U.S. imports in manufacturing from skill-abundant countries was equal to 0.59 in 2006.

\(^{23}\)The elasticity of the share of workers in Mexican firms with 9+, 12+, and 16+ years of education to firm sales is 0.08, 0.15, and 0.14 respectively. These figures are from unpublished results generated in connection with Verhoogen (2004) by INEGI personnel in Aguascalientes in compliance with legal confidentiality requirements.

\(^{24}\)These two observations are obtained from the BEA’s 2006 input-output tables, including only private industries. We match the share of trade in gross output as opposed to value added, because our model abstracts from intermediate inputs in production.

\(^{25}\)This figure is obtained as the product of the two following numbers: (i) the average of exports and imports between the set of skill- and unskill-abundant countries relative to the latter’s combined GDP, equal to 24% in 2006 based on information from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics and WDI; and (ii) the median share of value
output in country 1 is equal to $0.22 \times 22.7\% + (1 - 0.22) \times 3.3\% = 7.5\%$. Note that our parameterization abstracts from potentially important trade imbalances between skill-abundant and skill-scarce countries.

In our second baseline parameterization, which incorporates MP, we choose the country-level MP costs, $\mu_{12}$ and $\mu_{13}$, to match the two following observations on U.S. multinational activity in 2006 obtained from the BEA: (i) the local sales of majority-owned non-bank U.S. foreign affiliates divided by total U.S. exports is equal to 1.72; (ii) the share of local sales of majority-owned non-bank U.S. foreign affiliates located in skill-abundant countries is equal to 0.82.\footnote{Note in Table 1 that our calibration with trade and outsourcing requires a very high $\mu_{13}$. This is because country 3 has a very low relative TFP, so that producers from countries 1 and 2 have a large incentive to produce in country 3, which would generate a counterfactually high volume of outsourcing towards country 3. An alternative strategy to match our targets would be to assume a lower location-specific TFP in country 3, as in Burstein and Monge-Naranjo (2008). This would not alter our baseline calibration.}

Finally, we set the parameter that governs the mean and standard deviation of country/subsector-specific MP costs, $\theta_m = 0.1$. In our sensitivity analysis we consider alternative values of this parameter, $\theta_m = 0.2$ and $\theta_m = 1$, and show that the change in the skill premium is not largely affected.

Rows 1-9 in Table 2 report the implications of our two baseline parameterizations on the moments that we target in our calibration procedure. Note that in the first parameterization we abstract from MP and so we do not target the MP moments (displayed in rows 8 and 9). Rows 10-13 in Table 2 display four additional moments from our model that we do not target in our calibration. These four additional moments are (i) the fraction of exporting producers in country 1,\footnote{Estimates of the fraction of manufacturing plants that export in the U.S. range from 20\% to 30\% over the years 1987-1997; see e.g. Bernard and Jensen (2004) and Bernard et. al. (2007b). Bernard et. al. (2003) report that this ratio is 5.6 for U.S. manufacturing plants. Bernard et. al. (2007b) report that the ratio is 2.9 for U.S. manufacturing firms.} (ii) the sales of country 1 manufacturing exporters relative to non-exporters,\footnote{Bernard et. al. (2003) report that this ratio is 5.6 for U.S. manufacturing plants. Bernard et. al. (2007b) report that the ratio is 2.9 for U.S. manufacturing firms.} (iii) the median, across manufacturing sectors in country 1, of the average log-difference between the skill intensity of exporters and non-exporters,\footnote{Bernard et. al. (2007b) report that among U.S. manufacturing firms, log skill per worker—measured as non-production workers per total employment—is 0.11 points higher for exporters, controlling for industry fixed-effects.} and (iv) the median, across manufacturing sectors in country 3, of the average log-difference between the skill intensity of exporters and non-exporters.\footnote{In unpublished results, Verhoogen (2004) reports that among Mexican manufacturing firms, log skill per worker—measured as the share of workers with 9+, 12+, and 16+ years of education—is 0.12, 0.16, and 0.21 points higher for exporters, respectively.} Our baseline parameterizations are in line with the fraction of exporters and the size premium of exporters observed in U.S. data. Moreover, the skill-intensity premium of exporters is only slightly higher than the one documented by Bernard et. al. (2007b) for the U.S., and is in the range of estimates provided by Verhoogen (2004) for Mexico. These four additional moments provide further support added in gross output, equal to 0.5, across the set of unskill-abundant countries with available input-output data as reported by the OECD. Due to a lack of detailed information, we do not separately target manufacturing and non-manufacturing trade shares; nor do we separate trade in mining and agriculture from trade in other commodities.

Due to a lack of detailed information, we do not separately target manufacturing and non-manufacturing trade shares; nor do we separate trade in mining and agriculture from trade in other commodities.
for our choice of $\theta$ and $\varphi$, which—as we discuss below—shape the strength of the within effect.

**Baseline results:** In what follows we use our parameterized model to conduct a series of counterfactuals. We first consider a reduction in trade and MP costs starting in autarky (i.e. $\tau_{ij}^k = \infty$ and $\mu_{ij} = \infty$) to the levels of trade and MP costs that generate the volumes of international trade and MP observed in 2006. One way to interpret these counterfactuals is that they answer the question: But for globalization, by how much would the skill premium change? Rows 14 and 15 in Table 2 report the log-percentage change in the skill premium, $w/s$, resulting from these experiments under our two baseline parameterizations and our two additional parameterizations in which we impose $\varphi = 0$. Here we discuss only the baseline parameterizations. In the first baseline parameterization (with only trade), countries 1 and 2 experience a 3.46% increase in the skill premium while country 3 experiences a 5.69% increase in the skill premium. In the second baseline parameterization (with both trade and MP), countries 1 and 2 experience a 7.62% increase in the skill premium while country 3 experiences a 7.54% increase in the skill premium.

We also consider an alternative set of counterfactuals. Instead of starting from autarky, we choose initial trade and MP costs so that after lowering trade and MP costs to their baseline level, the trade share of output in country 1 increases by a factor of 3. In particular, we increase our baseline level of trade costs, $\tau_{12}^j$ and $\tau_{13}^j$ for $j = Q$ and $N$, by the same proportion so that at these higher trade costs, the average of exports and imports relative to total output in country 1 is roughly 2.5% instead of 7.5%. This three-fold increase in trade corresponds to the rise in the trade share of GDP in the U.S. between 1963 and 2006. We do not separately target the share of trade in manufacturing and non-manufacturing output in 1963 due to a lack of detailed information on U.S. sectoral gross output for this time period. Given that we do not have detailed information on the sales growth of U.S. foreign affiliates in this time period, we make two alternative assumptions regarding our target for the initial ratio of outward MP relative to exports in country 1: (i) we assume that it is equal to 1.72 as in our baseline parameterization, and (ii) we assume that is equal to 0. Presumably, the level of U.S. MP in 1963 lies somewhere between these two extremes.

We report the results from these counterfactuals in Rows 16-19 of Table 2. In the first baseline parameterization (with only trade), countries 1 and 2 experience a 2.1% increase in the skill premium while country 3 experiences a 3.1% increase in the skill premium. In the second baseline parameterization (with both trade and MP), countries 1 and 2 experience an increase in the skill premium ranging between 4.2% and 6.2%, while country 3 experiences an increase in the skill premium ranging between 5% and 5.9%.

To put these numbers into perspective, the U.S. College-High School wage gap rose by 26% between 1963 and 2005; see e.g. Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008). Therefore, under our preferred baseline parameterization (with trade and MP), the increase in country 1’s skill premium in response to the three-fold rise in globalization observed between 1963 and 2006 represents between 1/6 and 1/4 of the increase in the U.S. college premium during this period.
5.3 Understanding the Baseline Results

We now examine in greater detail the quantitative results of our baseline parameterizations. In order to do so, we focus in particular on the role of the model’s two key parameters shaping the strength of the between effect and the within effect: $\theta$ and $\varphi$. We discuss how our calibration strategy disciplines our choice of these two parameters; we confirm the analytic results from Section 3, which were derived under stronger assumptions; and we explore the quantitative role of $\theta$ and $\varphi$ in shaping the effects of globalization on the skill premium. For simplicity, we conduct these exercises in parameterizations with trade and no MP.

We first discuss how sectoral trade patterns shape our choice of $\theta$ in our calibration strategy. Figure 1 plots the share of imports in country 1 from country 2 by sector (similar to Figure 1 in Romalis (2004)) under two different values of $\theta$: $\theta = 0.05$ and $\theta = 0.25$. In both cases, we set $\varphi = 0.37$ and choose the remaining parameter values as in the baseline parameterization with no MP. Confirming our analytic results, as $\theta$ falls, sectoral comparative advantage driven by factor endowment differences becomes stronger; i.e. the absolute difference between the U.S.’s share of imports in manufacturing from skill-abundant countries in the 50% most skill-intensive sectors and in the 50% least skill-intensive sectors, which is the multi-sector version of $\Delta^3$, rises. Panel A of Table 3 reports this measure for a wide range of $\theta$’s. The difference of 0.11 in the U.S. trade data leads us to our choice of $\theta = 0.25$.

We now explore the role that higher values of $\theta$ play in mitigating the between effect, as detailed in Proposition 2 under a stricter set of assumptions. To isolate this effect of $\theta$ quantitatively, we assume that technology is Hicks-neutral, $\varphi = 0$, and abstract from MP, as in our first additional parameterization. Figure 2 depicts the percentage change in the skill premium in countries 1 and 3 as they move from autarky to the baseline shares of trade in output, for levels of $\theta$ ranging from 0.025 to 0.3. Figure 2 reveals that the strength of the between effect is significantly weakened as we raise $\theta$. For example, increasing $\theta$ from 0.025 to 0.1 reduces the change in the skill premium in all countries by more than half.

At our choice $\theta = 0.25$, the between effect is weak. This explains the relatively small impact of a reduction in trade costs on the skill premium in all countries when technology is Hicks-neutral, in Column 3 of Table 2. We obtain this result in spite of the fact that the ratio of factor endowment ratios, $(H_3/L_3)/(H_1/L_1)$, is 0.49. In our parameterized model, idiosyncratic productivity is sufficiently important to substantially mitigate the between effect.

We now explore the role of skill-biased technology. We discipline $\varphi$ by targeting the elasticity of skill intensity to sales at the producer level that we measure in the data. As illustrated in Panel B of Table 3, this elasticity is increasing in $\varphi$. We set $\varphi = 0.37$ to match an elasticity equal to 0.1 in country 3.

In Proposition 3 we proved that with two symmetric countries, the change in the skill premium in response to a reduction in trade costs is positive when $\varphi > 0$. Figure 3 confirms this result in
our asymmetric 3-country quantitative model. It also shows that higher values of \( \varphi \) strengthen the within effect. Intuitively, the difference in skill intensities of an efficient producer and a less efficient producer is strictly greater, the higher is \( \varphi \). That is, \( \frac{h}{l}(z, \varphi) \) is log-supermodular in \( z \) and \( \varphi \) so that within an industry \( \frac{\frac{h}{l}(z, \varphi)}{\frac{h}{l}(z', \varphi)} > \frac{\frac{h}{l}(z, \varphi')}{\frac{h}{l}(z', \varphi')} \) for all \( z > z' \) and \( \varphi > \varphi' \). Hence, when a reduction in trade costs induces low-\( z \) producers to contract and high-\( z \) producers to expand, the increase in the relative demand for skill is strictly greater, the higher is \( \varphi \).

While a higher \( \theta \) weakens the between effect, it strengthens the within effect. We illustrate this point quantitatively in Figure 4. This figure depicts the percentage change in the skill premium of moving from autarky to our baseline trade shares, for different values of \( \theta \), when technology is skill biased (\( \varphi > 0 \) is at its level of our two baseline parameterizations). Intuitively, as \( \theta \) rises, the relative difference in productivity between high- and low-productivity producers increases. Thus, reallocation across producers as a result of a decline in trade costs induces a greater increase in the relative demand for skill, the greater is \( \theta \). Hence, by strengthening the within effect and weakening the between effect, the percentage change in the skill premium in country 3 is increasing in \( \theta \). On the other hand, the change in the skill premium in country 1 is non-monotonic in \( \theta \) because a higher \( \theta \) strengthens the within effect and weakens the between effect, and these forces push the skill premium in opposite directions in a skill-abundant country. Note, however, that the within effect dominates for \( \theta > 0.1 \).

We are now equipped to understand the results of our baseline parameterizations with skill-biased technology. Without MP (Column 1 in Table 2), countries 1 and 2 experience a 3.46% increase in the skill premium, while country 3 experiences a 5.69% increase in the skill premium. The within effect is relatively strong compared to the between effect in all countries for two reasons. First, at \( \theta = 0.25 \), the between effect is weak (recall Figure 2 and Column 3 of Table 2). Second, at \( \varphi = 0.368 \) and \( \theta = 0.25 \), the within effect is strong (recall Figures 3 and 4).

The within effect is particularly strong in country 3 relative to countries 1 and 2 for two reasons. First, the fraction of producers that export from country 3, 14.5%, is relatively small compared to the fraction in countries 1 and 2, 19.6%, because country 3 is a small country and hence exports in fewer subsectors. Thus, the relative productivity—and therefore the relative skill intensity—of expanding producers to contracting producers is greater in country 3 than in countries 1 and 2. Second, the ratio of employment by (skill-intensive) exporters is higher in country 3 than in countries 1 and 2 because in our parameterization, the ratio of exports to output is relatively higher in country 3. Both of these forces imply that when factors reallocate across producers within a sector, the relative increase in the demand for skill is greater in country 3 than in countries 1 and 2.

When we reduce MP costs on top of the reduction in trade costs, in our second baseline parameterization (Column 2 in Table 2), the increase in the skill premium is larger: 7.62% in countries 1 and 2, and 7.54% in country 3. These results can be understood following the logic in Section
4. First, MP magnifies the within effect because subsectors that expand by adopting foreign technology become more skill intensive. Second, the between effect is strengthened when technologies can be internationally reallocated because relative factor rewards become more important in determining relative costs of production. This is apparent from comparing the relative changes in the skill premia across Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2, where technology is Hicks-neutral so that only the between effect is active. The strengthening of the between effect leads to an increase in the skill premium for skill-abundant countries, and a reduction for the unskill-abundant country. This partly explains why including MP increases the skill premium by a larger magnitude in country 1 than in country 3.

6 Quantitative Analysis: Additional Implications

In this section, we discuss additional implications of our model and link these to others’ and our own empirical findings. We first show that our model with skill-biased technology implies that trade is more prevalent in skill-intensive sectors, and provide support for this implication using U.S. data. We then discuss the impact of globalization on sectoral price changes, on the reallocation of factors between sectors, and on the factor content of trade, all of which have received significant attention in the literature.

Trade and skill intensity: In our model with skill-biased technology, normalized trade (defined as the ratio of exports plus imports to output minus net exports) is greater in skill-intensive sectors. This is illustrated in Figure 5, which depicts a positive relation in the model between country 1’s normalized trade by sector and sectoral skill intensity for all manufacturing sectors, under our baseline parameterization with trade and MP.\footnote{This pattern is very similar in the parameterization with trade only.} Figure 5 also shows that this relation is essentially flat in our parameterization with Hicks-neutral technology.

We prove this result analytically, in Proposition 6 in the Appendix under Assumptions A1 and A3. The intuition is that idiosyncratic comparative advantage is relatively more important in skill-intensive sectors. Hence, a given productivity advantage, $z_i > z_{-i}$, provides country $i$ producers in the skill-intensive sector a relatively larger cost advantage than in the unskill-intensive sector. This implies that the value of trade as a fraction of sectoral absorption (i.e. production minus net exports) is increasing in a sector’s skill intensity.

This result is similar to that in Fieler (2007), which predicts that one sector is more traded than another, but unlike Fieler (2007) does not rely on an assumption that the distribution of productivities is more dispersed in one sector than in another.\footnote{Similarly, Epifani and Gancia (2006) assume that industries with a high degree of product differentiation are skill intensive.} Instead, in our model the interaction between skill intensity and productivity causes the same distribution of productivities in all sectors to yield a more dispersed distribution of unit costs in skill-intensive sectors. Our model,
therefore, predicts that normalized world trade is greatest in the most skill-intensive sectors, even after controlling for the dispersion of productivities or the elasticity of substitution.

To evaluate this prediction of the model, we construct measures of U.S. normalized trade in manufacturing sectors using the BEA’s detailed IO tables for the 2002 Benchmark. We regress these on (i) sectoral skill intensity measured by the share of non-production workers and (ii) a measure of the sector’s elasticity of substitution as reported in Broda and Weinstein (2006). Table 4 reports the results. We run the regression without controlling for the elasticity of substitution—reported in Columns 1 and 2—and also controlling for the elasticity of substitution—reported in Columns 3 and 4. In Column 1 we use all available manufacturing IO-code sectors and in Column 2 we restrict the sample to the manufacturing IO-code sectors for which we have a measure of the elasticity of substitution. In Column 3 we control for the median and in Column 4 we control for the average Broda and Weinstein (2006) elasticity of substitution corresponding to each manufacturing IO-code sector. In all specifications, the coefficient on skill intensity is positive and significant at the 1% level. To our knowledge, we are the first to identify this relationship in the data. We acknowledge that there are alternative mechanisms that could also lead to this pattern in the data. For example, an alternative hypothesis that is also consistent with the results in Table 4 is that trade costs are lower in skill-intensive sectors.

Sectoral prices: In our model, globalization impacts sectoral prices, $P_i(j)$, through two channels. First, it increases the relative price of sectors intensive in the locally abundant factor, as in the Heckscher-Ohlin model. Second, in our parameterization with skill-biased technology, it leads to a greater increase in trade volumes in skill-intensive sectors. This decreases the relative price of skill-intensive goods as in a standard model of skill-biased technological change. These two channels push relative sector-level prices in opposite directions in a skill-abundant country such as the U.S.

Figure 6 displays the percentage change in sectoral prices of manufactured goods in country 1 of moving from autarky to our baseline levels of trade and MP, with Hicks-neutral technology and skill-biased technology. With Hicks-neutral technology, the relative price of skill-intensive sectors increases, as in the H-O model (note that the slope of the curve is only slightly positive because the increase in the skill premium is small–recall Column 3 in Table 2). With skill-biased technology, the relative price of skill-intensive sectors falls because the within effect is more powerful than the between effect.

Hence, our model provides a quantitatively powerful mechanism that can counter the direct effect of the skill premium on the relative price of skill-intensive sectors. It has the potential to address the observation that large changes in the skill premium in the U.S. have been accompanied

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33 In the denominator of our measure of normalized trade, we use gross output plus imports minus exports, which differs from absorption. The latter is based on final demand instead of gross output.

34 That reductions in trade costs increase trade more in skill-intensive sectors is not an unambiguous prediction of the model. Indeed, one can show that the growth of trade in skill-intensive sectors is higher (lower) at high (low) trade costs.
by relatively small changes in the relative price of skilled to unskilled goods (see e.g. Lawrence and Slaughter (1993)), which has been interpreted as evidence that globalization is not responsible for much of the rise in inequality. We do not attempt to assess the quantitative success of our model in matching sectoral price changes because our model does not fully account for the rise in the skill premium over this period.

**Cross-sector factor reallocation**: If the between effect is responsible for increasing the skill premium, we should observe an increase in the relative demand for skilled workers resulting from shifts in the sectoral distribution of employment towards skill-intensive sectors. At fixed factor supplies, this requires within-sector reductions in skill intensities. However, empirical studies document both within-industry increases in the share of skilled workers—see e.g. Berman et. al. (1994) for the U.S.—and relatively little between-sector labor reallocation—see e.g. Currie and Harrison (1997) for Morocco, Hanson and Harrison (1999) for Mexico, and Attanasio et. al. (2004) for Colombia.

In our model, as in any standard framework with constant and inelastically supplied labor endowments, simple accounting implies that it is impossible to obtain both between-sector reallocation towards skill-intensive sectors and within-sector increases in the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers. If one is positive, then the other must be negative. Hence, observed increases in both between- and within-sector reallocations provide evidence of growing skill endowments but do not provide evidence that globalization has not affected inequality.

Our framework, like the H-O model, predicts that a country’s labor reallocates towards sectors that are intensive in its locally abundant factor. However, the magnitude of this reallocation is significantly smaller in our framework than in the H-O model because higher values of \( \theta \) reduce inter-sectoral factor reallocation. For example, in our baseline parameterization with only trade, the increase in the share of manufacturing labor employed in the 50% most skill intensive sectors that results from moving from autarky to current levels of trade is 3.7%. However, when we reduce idiosyncratic productivity differences and set \( \theta = 0.025 \), the increase in the share rises to 9.3%. Hence, our framework can generate a larger increase in the skill premium and less between-sector labor reallocation than can our parameterization with weaker idiosyncratic productivity dispersion.

**Factor content of trade**: According to Krugman (2000), “...many economists studying the impact of trade on wages have been reluctant to commit themselves to a specific CGE model. Instead, they have tried to use a shortcut, by estimating the ‘factor content’ of trade.” A typical approach to calculating the factor content of trade is to estimate the factors of production used to produce exports and subtract from this an estimate of the factors of production that would have been used to produce imports. The factor content of trade is then subtracted from actual factor endowments. Dividing the percentage change in the effective ratio of skilled to unskilled endowments that is induced by trade by an estimate of the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers gives an estimate of the impact of trade on the skill premium. We investigate to what extent this is a reasonable approach to determining the change in the skill premium from a reduction
in trade costs. To do so we replicate this exercise on data generated by our model under our parameterizations with Hicks-neutral and skill-biased technology (with only trade and no MP) and compare the estimated changes in the skill premium with the actual changes in the skill premium that result from the full model.

In order to calculate the factor content of trade, we must estimate the factors of production (i) that are used to produce exports and (ii) that would have been used to produce imports. This is an extremely difficult task. Here, we follow the "equal allocation" procedure of Katz and Murphy (1992) and measure the factors of production used to produce county 1 exports and that would have been used to produce county 1 imports, using country 1 average unit labor requirements.

With Hicks-neutral technology (Column 3 in Table 2), the actual increase in the skill premium in country 1 according to the model is 0.4%. Using data generated by the model and the factor content of trade approach, the increase in the skill premium in country 1 is estimated to be 0.5%. In our baseline parameterization with skill-biased technology (Column 1 in Table 2), the actual increase in the skill premium in country 1 is 3.5%. Using data generated by the model and the factor content of trade approach, the increase in the skill premium in country 1 is estimated to be 0.2%.

The equal allocation approach to the factor content of trade does well in the first case with Hicks-neutral technology and poorly in the second case with skill-biased technology because the assumptions underlying the equal allocation counterfactual are reasonable in the prior case—in which all producers in a sector share the same skill intensity—but not the latter case—in which the skill intensity of a typical exporting producer is relatively high compared to the skill intensity of a typical producer that is replaced by imports. It remains an open research question whether one can find a simple back-of-the-envelope procedure to adequately measure the factor content of trade when technology is skill biased.

7 Quantitative Analysis: Sensitivity and Other Counterfactuals

In this section, we perform sensitivity analyses to better understand the role (both qualitative and quantitative) of various parameters in our model. We also perform additional counterfactual experiments to assess how the geographic composition of globalization (i.e. the overall share of country 1’s trade and MP with skill-scarce countries), the extent of globalization (i.e. the size of trade and MP as a share of output), and the type of globalization (i.e. the relative importance of trade and MP) impact the skill premium in our model.

7.1 Sensitivity Analysis

In Section 5.3 we discussed the relationship between our model’s two key parameters, \( \theta \) and \( \varphi \), and the impact of globalization on the skill premium. In this subsection, we provide additional
sensitivity analyses with respect to other model parameters (holding $\theta$ and $\varphi$ constant). In Columns 1-11 of Table 5, we report the change in the skill premium in countries 1 and 3 of going from autarky to the baseline trade shares under alternative parameterizations. We focus on counterfactuals in which we lower trade and MP costs from their autarky levels to those consistent with 2006 levels of trade and MP to ease the comparison of results across alternative parameterizations. Columns 1 and 2 report the change in the skill premium under our baseline parameterizations, with and without MP, respectively.

We first consider a calibration of our model, without MP, with a higher elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor while holding $\varphi$ constant, reported in Columns 3-4 of Table 5. We consider $\rho = 1.4$ (here we are using Katz and Murphy’s (1992) estimate without taking into account the intra- and inter-sectoral factor reallocation that is present in our model) and $\rho = 2$ (this is on the high side of the estimates by Borjas et al. (1997), again without taking into account the intra- and inter-sectoral factor reallocation that is present in our model), instead of $\rho = 1.2$. The rise in country 1’s (country 3’s) skill premium is 2.5% (3.3%) when $\rho = 1.4$, and 1.5% (1.9%) when $\rho = 2$, instead of 3.5% (5.7%) when $\rho = 1.2$. Clearly, a higher elasticity $\rho$ requires a smaller change in the equilibrium skill premium in response to an increase in the relative demand for skilled labor induced by globalization.

Next, we report results using a lower and a higher elasticity of substitution between sectors and sub-sectors ($\eta = 2$ and $\eta = 3.5$, instead of $\eta = 3$) in our parameterization without MP, reported in Columns 5-6 of Table 5. The rise in country 1’s (country 3’s) skill premium is 3% (3.6%) when $\eta = 2$, and 3.4% (6.2%) when $\eta = 3.5$. A higher elasticity $\eta$ magnifies the effects of skill-biased technology on the skill premium because it amplifies size differences across producers with different productivities (and hence skill intensities). However, a higher elasticity also mitigates the between effect because, even under autarky, countries specialize in sectors with comparative advantage, and hence the extent of sectoral reallocation induced by trade is weaker. All this implies that a higher $\eta$ leads unambiguously to a larger increase in country 3’s skill premium, but has an ambiguous effect on country 1’s skill premium (in the cases we consider, the increase in country 1’s skill premium is lower with both $\eta = 2$ and $\eta = 3.5$).

We then consider a calibration of our model in which we abstract from non-manufactured goods. That is, we increase the share of manufactured goods from $\gamma = 0.22$ to $\gamma = 1$, reported in Columns 7-8 of Table 5. We choose the level of trade costs to match the share of trade in manufacturing in our baseline parameterization. Given that manufactured goods are more heavily traded than non-manufactured goods, this alternative parameterization results in a much higher share of trade in the overall economy: the average of exports and imports relative to total output in country 1 increases from 7.5% when $\gamma = 0.22$ to 22.5% when $\gamma = 1$. The increase in the skill premium of going from autarky to these higher levels of trade is roughly three times larger than under our baseline parameterization without MP: 9.4% in country 1 and 13.8% in country 3. If we also incorporate MP
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(and target a ratio of outward MP sales to exports in country 1 equal to 1, roughly that observed in the U.S. manufacturing industries in 2006), the increase in the skill premium is 13.1% in country 1 and 13.3% in country 3. Note that the increase in the skill-premium is larger in country 1 than in country 3, relative to the parameterization without MP, because MP magnifies the between effect. These results reveal that it is important to take into consideration the share of globalization in the overall economy and not only in manufacturing in order to quantitatively assess the role of globalization on the skill premium.\(^{35}\)

In the next two sensitivity analyses we change the level of trade and MP that we target in our calibration as follows. First, we increase country 1’s share of trade over output in manufacturing from 22.7% to 40%. The latter corresponds to the share of trade in manufacturing for a skill-abundant country that is more open than the U.S., such as France in 2005. In this case, we abstract from MP. Second, starting from our baseline with MP, we increase the ratio of MP to exports in country 1, from 1.72 to 2.8. The latter value corresponds to total sales of majority-owned non-bank U.S. foreign affiliates relative to U.S. exports (in our baseline parameterization, we only included local sales to the host economy). Results are displayed in Columns 9 and 10 of Table 5. In the first case, the increase in country 1’s skill premium starting from autarky is 4.7% (instead of 3.5%). In the second case, the increase in country 1’s skill premium starting from autarky is 8.9% (instead of 7.6%).

We finally consider a version of our model with MP in which we increase the parameter \(\theta_m\) that governs the mean and standard deviation of country/subsector-specific MP costs. As we increase \(\theta_m\) we must reduce the level of country-level MP costs to match our target MP-to-export ratios. Column 11 of Table 5 shows that if we double \(\theta_m\) from 0.1 to 0.2, the rise in the skill premium in countries 1 and 3 of going from autarky to the baseline levels of trade and MP is 7.6% and 8.4% (instead of 7.9% and 7.8%), respectively. We also consider an increase in \(\theta_m\) of a factor of 10 from 0.1 to 1, and the rise in the skill premium in countries 1 and 3 is 6.9% and 9.2%, respectively (not reported in Table 5). We see that very large changes in \(\theta_m\) have a relatively small effect on the rise in the skill premium from globalization.

We conclude that while the size of the change in the skill premium varies to some degree across these alternative parameterizations, in all cases the within effect is stronger than the between effect, so that the skill premium increases even in skill-scarce countries.

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\(^{35}\) We can also view these results as roughly the increase in the manufacturing skill premium from globalization in an economy in which labor mobility between manufacturing and non-manufacturing is restricted. In this case, the increase in the manufacturing skill premium would be significantly larger than the increase in the non-manufacturing skill premium.
7.2 Changing the Extent, Composition, and Type of Globalization

Here we consider sensitivity analyses and counterfactuals regarding the geographic composition of globalization, i.e. the overall share of country 1’s trade and MP with skill-scarce countries; the extent of globalization, i.e. the size of trade and MP as a share of output; and the type of globalization, i.e. the relative importance of trade and MP.

The geographical composition of globalization: Our discussion of the impact of globalization on the skill premium has already raised the question of the differential impact on a skill-abundant country, such as the U.S., of globalization with a skill-abundant or an unskill-abundant country. Clearly, the relative strength of the between and within effects plays a large role in determining the answer to this question.

The between effect is relatively weak compared to the within effect. This was already apparent from comparing the changes in the skill premia across Columns 2 and 4 of Table 2. These two parameterizations differ only in our choice of how to set the value of \( \varphi \)—which is zero in Column 4, so that only the between effect is active, and is set to match the elasticity of skill intensity to sales in Column 2, so that both the between and within effects are active. In countries 1 and 2, the change in the skill premium of moving from autarky to 2006 levels of trade and MP is 1.12% and 7.62% with Hicks-neutral and skill-biased technology, respectively. The relative weakness of the between effect is even more apparent when considering country 3, where the change is -2.53% and 7.54% with Hicks-neutral and skill-biased technology, respectively.

To address further the question of how the composition of globalization affects country 1’s skill premium, we ask: What would happen to the skill premium in country 1 if country 3’s share of skilled workers rose to equal to that in countries 1 and 2, \( H_3/L_3 = H_1/L_1 \), while all other parameters remain constant at the level in our preferred baseline calibration? The results are presented in Column 12 of Table 5. In spite of having eliminated the between effect, the skill premium falls by only 0.6% in country 1 relative to the skill-premium in our baseline parameterization, where \( H_3/L_3 \approx \frac{1}{2} H_1/L_1 \).

Perhaps one reason that we find that the composition of globalization is relatively unimportant in the two previous counterfactuals is because the share of country 1’s trade and MP with country 3 is relatively small. To address this issue we calculate the change in the skill premium from increasing the shares of trade and MP between countries 1 and 3 from zero to one, for given fixed total shares of trade and MP in country 1. In the parameterization with trade only, the skill premium in country 1 increases by only 1% as the between effect becomes slightly stronger. In the parameterization with trade and MP, surprisingly, the skill premium in country 1 falls by 3.5%. This results from the fact that in this case country 1 receives almost no inward MP because country 3 producers are relatively unproductive. From these counterfactuals we conclude that country 3’s very low TFP in our parameterization plays a larger role than its low skill abundance in determining the importance of country 1’s geographic composition of globalization for its skill premium.
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The extent of globalization: We now perform counterfactuals to study the implications of further reductions in trade and MP costs on the skill premium, starting at the level of trade and MP observed in 2006. In these exercises, we do not recalibrate the model as we reduce trade and MP costs.

First we reduce all trade costs proportionately and all country-specific MP costs proportionately to double the trade share of output from the level in 2006 while maintaining the same ratio of outward MP to exports in country 1. Country 1 experiences a 2.8% increase in its skill premium and country 3 experiences a 6.3% increase in its skill premium (reported in Column 13 in Table 5).

Second we ask: What is the upper bound on the increase in the skill premium from trade integration, with no MP, starting at the observed level of trade in 2006? In order to address this question, we move to a zero-gravity world by removing all trade costs (i.e. $\tau_{ij}^k = 1$ for all $i, j, k$), starting at our first baseline parameterization—without MP. Country 1 experiences a 10% increase in its skill premium and country 3 experiences a 9.7% increase in its skill premium (reported in Column 14 in Table 5). The skill premium increases in country 3 because the within effect dominates the between effect.

In our third counterfactual, we re-calculate the increase in the skill premium from moving to a zero-gravity world, but this time we incorporate MP. This is important because, from Proposition 4, falling MP costs strengthen the between effect. In particular, we remove all trade and MP costs (i.e. $\tau_{ij}^k = 1$, $\mu_{ij} = 1$ for all $i, j, k$, and $\theta_m = 0$) from our second baseline parameterization. Country 1 experiences a 34.7% increase in its skill premium and country 3 experiences a 15% decrease in its skill premium (reported in Column 15 in Table 5). The rise in country 1’s skill premium of going from current levels of globalization to a zero-gravity world is more than three times as large with MP as without MP. Moreover, the skill premium actually falls in country 3 going from current levels of globalization to a zero-gravity world with MP.

These counterfactuals suggest that at our baseline shares of trade and MP the between effect is dormant, but not dead. That is, in spite of our finding that the between effect is weak—which accords well with empirical studies of the implications of globalization in the developing world—this need not remain the case as future trade and MP costs fall. Hence, further reductions in trade and MP costs may have large and divergent impacts on the skill premium in skill-abundant and unskill-abundant countries.

The type of globalization: What is the contribution of trade and what is the contribution of MP in determining the rise of the skill premium? To provide a simple answer to this question, we compare the rise in the skill premium of moving from autarky to the levels of trade in 2006 with no MP (Column 1 in Table 2), to that of moving from autarky to the levels of trade and MP in 2006 (Column 2 in Table 2). The rise in the skill-premium with trade alone is 45% (75%) as large as the rise in the skill-premium with both trade and MP in country 1 (country 3). That trade is relatively more important in country 3 than in country 1 is not surprising: MP increases the between effect,
as established in Proposition 4, which decreases the skill premium in country 3 and increases it in country 1.

This comparison, however, is imperfect because in recalibrating the model with trade and MP, we have changed not only trade and MP costs, but also country 3’s TFP. We thus consider an additional counterfactual in which we calibrate the model with only trade assuming the same TFP in country 3 as in the parameterization with trade and MP (and we do not target the share of country 1 imports in manufacturing from country 2). This counterfactual gives very similar results to those above: the rise of the skill premium in country 1 (country 3) with trade alone is 49% (66%) of the rise in the skill premium with both trade and MP.

We conclude that both trade and MP are quantitatively important to assess the impact of globalization on the skill premium.

8 Conclusions

We have constructed a quantitative model of international trade and MP to study the impact of globalization on the skill premium in developed and developing countries. The key mechanisms in our framework arise from the interaction between three elements: factor-endowment differences, technological heterogeneity across producers within sectors, and skill-biased technology. By combining these three elements, our model includes both the between effect and the within effect of globalization on the skill premium. We have shown that within-sector heterogeneity can (i) rationalize the finding—in previous empirical studies—that the between effect is weak, and (ii) generate a strong within effect, which can lead to a rise in the skill premium in both skill-abundant and skill-scarce countries. We have also shown that multinational production strengthens both the between and within effects of globalization on the skill premium. We use our framework to investigate, both theoretically and quantitatively, the impact on the skill premium of changes in the extent (the share of trade and MP in output), the geographical composition (the relative importance of skill-abundant and skill-scarce countries in the world economy), and the type (international trade and MP) of globalization.

When the model is parameterized to match salient features of the extent and composition of U.S. trade and MP with skill-abundant and skill-scarce countries, the within effect is significantly stronger than the between effect, so that a reduction in trade and MP costs increases the skill premium in both skill-abundant and skill-scarce countries. In response to the three-fold increase in the extent of globalization in the U.S. over the last 40 years, the model generates an increase in the U.S. skill premium in the range of 4% to 6%, or 1/6 to 1/4 of the rise of the college wage premium during this period. The rise of trade and MP have an impact of similar magnitude on the skill premium, suggesting that considerations of both trade and MP are important to assess the overall impact of globalization on the skill premium. The between effect is weak in our parameterization,
implying that the skill-abundance of a country’s trade and MP partners does not play a significant role in determining the impact of globalization on the country’s skill premium.

While our framework captures two important forces in the debate on globalization and the skill premium, the between and within effects, and incorporates both trade and MP, it abstracts from other interesting and potentially important considerations. For example, our model abstracts from additional factors of production (such as land, other natural resources, and capital) and does not incorporate changes in the supply of skilled and unskilled labor, skill-biased technical change, process and product innovation, and capital accumulation with capital-skill complementarity. Our analysis also abstracts from considerations of unemployment and within-group inequality. Extending our model along these directions is a fruitful area for future research to fully assess the quantitative effects of globalization on inequality.

Finally, the mechanisms studied in this paper apply equally well to intra-national integration as to international integration. The effects of intra-national integration on the skill premium could prove quantitatively large given the high volumes of intra-national trade relative to international trade in the United States.

## A Characterizing Equilibrium in Special Cases

### A.1 Characterizing Equilibrium with Hicks-Neutral Technologies

Here we impose Assumptions A1 and A2. The equilibrium values of \( \{w_1, w_2, s_1, s_2, Q_1P_1, Q_2P_2\} \) can be solved using: the balanced trade condition (5); our choice of world income as the numeraire, \( Q_1P_1 + Q_2P_2 = 1 \); and the labor market clearing conditions (3) and (4), which, together with cost minimization, can be expressed as

\[
2H_is_i = \sum_{j=x,y} \alpha_j [\pi_{ii}(j) Q_iP_i + \pi_{-ii}(j) Q_{-i}P_{-i}] 
\]

\[
2L_iw_i = \sum_{j=x,y} (1 - \alpha_j) [\pi_{ii}(j) Q_iP_i + \pi_{-ii}(j) Q_{-i}P_{-i}] 
\]

**MP:** To solve for the equilibrium of our model with MP under Assumptions A1 and A2, we use Equations (9) and (10), where \( \pi_{ni}(j) \) is defined by Equation (8).
A.2 Characterizing Equilibrium with Skill-Biased Technology

Under Assumptions A1 and A3, we can write the factor market clearing conditions as

\[ L = \sum_{j=x,y} \left[ \int_0^\infty l_{ii} (z, j) \chi_{ii} (z, j) \, dz + \int_0^\infty l_{-ii} (z, j) \chi_{-ii} (z, j) \, dz \right] \]

\[ H = \sum_{j=x,y} \left[ \int_0^\infty h_{ii} (z, j) \chi_{ii} (z, j) \, dz + \int_0^\infty h_{-ii} (z, j) \chi_{-ii} (z, j) \, dz \right] \]

Here, \( l_{ii} (z, j) \) (\( l_{-ii} (z, j) \)) is the unskilled labor demanded by a country \( i \) subsector operating in sector \( j \) with productivity \( z \) in order to supply the domestic (export) market, conditional on supplying that market. We similarly define \( h_{ii} (z, j) \) and \( h_{-ii} (z, j) \) as the skilled labor demanded by a country \( i \) subsector operating in sector \( j \) with productivity \( z \) in order to supply the domestic (export) market, conditional on supplying said market. We define \( \chi_{ii} (z, j) / \int_0^\infty \chi_{ii} (z, j) \, dz \) as the density of productivities of subsectors in country \( i \) sector \( j \) that supply the domestic market. Finally, we similarly define \( \chi_{-ii} (z, j) / \int_0^\infty \chi_{-ii} (z, j) \, dz \) as the density of productivities of subsectors in country \( i \) sector \( j \) that supply the foreign market.

Equation (1), Equation (2), and the assumption that \( \eta = 1 \) yield

\[ l_{ii} (z, j) = l_{-ii} (z, j) = \frac{1}{w} f \left( \frac{w}{s}, z, j \right) \]

\[ h_{ii} (z, j) = h_{-ii} (z, j) = \frac{1}{s} g \left( \frac{w}{s}, z, j \right) \]

where

\[ f \left( \frac{w}{s}, z, j \right) \equiv (1 - \alpha_j) \left[ \alpha_j z^\phi \left( \frac{w}{s} \right)^{\rho-1} + 1 - \alpha_j \right]^{-1} \]

\[ g \left( \frac{w}{s}, z, j \right) \equiv \alpha_j \left[ (1 - \alpha_j) z^{-\phi} \left( \frac{w}{s} \right)^{1-\rho} + \alpha_j \right]^{-1} \]

under the normalization that each country’s total expenditure is two, \( Q_i P_i = 2 \). Note that the labor use of a producer with productivity \( z \) is the same for domestic sales and for exports. This is a consequence of the assumption that \( \eta = 1 \), which implies that the direct effect of a reduction in trade costs—less labor is required to sell a given quantity of output in the foreign market—and the indirect effect—falling export prices increase the quantity sold in export markets—exactly offset.
each other. Substituting Equations (11) and (12) into the factor market clearing conditions yields

\[ wL = \sum_{j=x,y} \int_{0}^{\infty} f \left( \frac{w}{s}, z, j \right) \left[ \chi_{ii} (z, j) + \chi_{-ii} (z, j) \right] dz \] (15)

\[ sH = \sum_{j=x,y} \int_{0}^{\infty} g \left( \frac{w}{s}, z, j \right) \left[ \chi_{ii} (z, j) + \chi_{-ii} (z, j) \right] dz \]

B Proofs

**Proof of Lemma 1.** Trade balance, \( \Delta_1 Q_1 P_1 = \Delta_2 Q_2 P_2 \), implies \( Q_1 P_1 / Q_2 P_2 = \Delta_2 / \Delta_1 \). Moreover, using the definitions of \( \Delta_1 \) and \( \Delta_3 \), we have \( \pi_{12} (x) = \Delta_1 - \frac{1}{2} \Delta_3 \), \( \pi_{12} (y) = \Delta_1 + \frac{1}{2} \Delta_3 \), \( \pi_{11} (x) = 1 - \pi_{12} (x) \), and \( \pi_{11} (y) = 1 - \pi_{12} (y) \). It remains only to solve for the \( \pi_{2i} (j) \) terms.

Using Equation (6) and the fact that \( \pi_{12} (x) = \Delta_1 - \frac{1}{2} \Delta_3 \), we have

\[ \left[ \left( \frac{s_2}{s_1} \right)^{\alpha_x} \left( \frac{w_2}{w_1} \right)^{1-\alpha_x} \right]^{1/\theta} = \left[ \frac{1}{\tau A_1 (x)} \right]^{1/\theta} \left( \frac{1}{\Delta_1 - \frac{1}{2} \Delta_3} - 1 \right) \] (16)

Similarly, using Equation (6) and the fact that \( \pi_{12} (y) = \Delta_1 + \frac{1}{2} \Delta_3 \), we have

\[ \left[ \left( \frac{s_2}{s_1} \right)^{\alpha_y} \left( \frac{w_2}{w_1} \right)^{1-\alpha_y} \right]^{1/\theta} = \left[ \frac{1}{\tau A_1 (y)} \right]^{1/\theta} \left( \frac{1}{\Delta_1 - \frac{1}{2} \Delta_3} - 1 \right) \] (17)

Using Equation (6) and substituting in using Equation (16) yields

\[ \pi_{21} (x) = \left[ \tau^{2/\theta} \left( \frac{1}{\Delta_1 - \frac{1}{2} \Delta_3} - 1 \right) - 1 \right]^{-1} \] (18)

Similarly, using Equation (6) and substituting in using Equation (17) yields

\[ \pi_{21} (y) = \left[ \tau^{2/\theta} \left( \frac{1}{\Delta_1 + \frac{1}{2} \Delta_3} - 1 \right) - 1 \right]^{-1} \] (19)

Combining Equations (18) and (19) with \( \Delta_2 = \frac{1}{2} [\pi_{21} (x) + \pi_{21} (y)] \) provides an implicit solution for \( \tau \) as a function of \( \Delta_1, \Delta_2, \) and \( \Delta_3 \) alone. Thus, \( \pi_{21} (x) \) and \( \pi_{21} (y) \) are pinned down by \( \alpha_x, \alpha_y, \Delta_1, \Delta_2, \) and \( \Delta_3 \). Finally, \( \pi_{22} (x) = 1 - \pi_{21} (x) \) and \( \pi_{22} (y) = 1 - \pi_{21} (y) \). QED.

**Proof of Proposition 1.** We focus on proving Proposition 1 for country 1 in the case in which \( \Delta_3 > 0 \). In particular, we prove that \( \frac{\Delta_1}{\Delta_1, \Delta_2, \Delta_3 > 0} < \frac{\Delta_1}{\Delta_1, \Delta_2, \Delta_3 > 0} \) for arbitrary \( \Delta_1, \Delta_2, \Delta_3 > 0 \). The proof for country 2 in the case in which \( \Delta_3 > 0 \), and the proof for countries 1 and 2 in the
case in which $\Delta_3 < 0$ are very similar. The proof of Proposition 1 requires a preliminary Lemma.

**Lemma 2** If $\Delta_3 > \Delta'_3 \geq 0$, $\Delta_1 = \Delta'_1 > 0$, and $\Delta_2 = \Delta'_2 > 0$, then $\frac{s_1}{w_1} \Delta'_3 < \frac{s_1}{w_1} \Delta_3$.

**Proof of Lemma 2.** We first show that if $\Delta_3 > \Delta'_3 \geq 0$, $\Delta_1 = \Delta'_1 > 0$, and $\Delta_2 = \Delta'_2 > 0$, then $\pi_{21}(y) < \pi'_{21}(y)$ and $\pi_{21}(x) > \pi'_{21}(x)$. We have

$$\pi_{12}(x) = \Delta_1 - \frac{1}{2} \Delta_3 < \Delta_1 - \frac{1}{2} \Delta'_3 = \pi'_{12}(x)$$

(20)

and

$$\pi_{12}(y) = \Delta_1 + \frac{1}{2} \Delta_3 > \Delta_1 + \frac{1}{2} \Delta'_3 = \pi'_{12}(y)$$

(21)

Equation (6) and Equations (20) and (21) imply

$$\left( \frac{v_2(x)v'_1(x)}{v_1(x)v'_2(x)} \right)^{-1/\theta} < \left( \frac{\tau'}{\tau} \right)^{-1/\theta} < \left( \frac{v_2(y)v'_1(y)}{v_1(y)v'_2(y)} \right)^{-1/\theta}$$

(22)

Since $\Delta_2$ is fixed, i.e. $\pi_{21}(x) + \pi_{21}(y) = \pi'_{21}(x) + \pi'_{21}(y)$, using Equation (6) we have

$$\gamma_1 \left[ 1 - \left( \frac{\tau'}{\tau} \right)^{-1/\theta} \left( \frac{v_2(x)v'_1(x)}{v_1(x)v'_2(x)} \right)^{-1/\theta} \right] = \gamma_2 \left[ \left( \frac{\tau'}{\tau} \right)^{-1/\theta} \left( \frac{v_2(y)v'_1(y)}{v_1(y)v'_2(y)} \right)^{-1/\theta} - 1 \right]$$

(23)

where $\gamma_1 > 0$ and $\gamma_2 > 0$ are functions of $\tau$, $\tau'$, and the $v$’s. Combining Equations (22) and (23) yields

$$\gamma_1 \left[ 1 - \left( \frac{\tau'}{\tau} \right)^{-1/\theta} \left( \frac{v_2(y)v'_1(y)}{v_1(y)v'_2(y)} \right)^{-1/\theta} \right] < -\gamma_2 \left[ 1 - \left( \frac{\tau'}{\tau} \right)^{-1/\theta} \left( \frac{v_2(y)v'_1(y)}{v_1(y)v'_2(y)} \right)^{-1/\theta} \right]$$

which implies

$$\left( \frac{\tau'}{\tau} \right)^{-1/\theta} \left( \frac{v_1(y)v'_2(y)}{v_2(y)v'_1(y)} \right)^{-1/\theta} < 1.$$ (24)

To obtain a contradiction, suppose that $\pi_{21}(y) \geq \pi'_{21}(y)$. This is equivalent to $\left( \frac{\tau'}{\tau} \right)^{-1/\theta} \leq \left( \frac{\tau'_1}{\tau_1} \right)^{-1/\theta}$, which contradicts Equation (24). Therefore, $\pi_{21}(y) < \pi'_{21}(y)$, which implies $\pi_{21}(x) > \pi'_{21}(x)$. Hence, we have proven that if $\Delta_3 > \Delta'_3 \geq 0$, $\Delta_1 = \Delta'_1 > 0$, and $\Delta_2 = \Delta'_2 > 0$, then $\pi_{21}(y) < \pi'_{21}(y)$ and $\pi_{21}(x) > \pi'_{21}(x)$, holding trade shares constant.

To conclude the proof of Lemma 2, denote by

$$\gamma(\Delta_3) = \left( \frac{s_1}{w_1} \right) = \frac{L_1}{H_1} \left[ \alpha_x R(x) + \alpha_y R(y) \right]$$

where $R(j) = [\pi_{21}(j) Q_2 P_2 + \pi_{11}(j) Q_1 P_1]$ and $R'(j) = [\pi'_{21}(j) Q'_2 P'_2 + \pi'_{11}(j) Q'_1 P'_1]$. Hence,
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\( \gamma (\Delta_3) > \gamma (\Delta'_3) \) if and only if \( R(x) R'(y) > R'(x) R(y) \).

Given \( \Delta_1 \) and \( \Delta_2 \) constant, we have \( Q_1 P_1/Q_2 P_2 = Q'_1 P'_1/Q'_2 P'_2 = \Delta_2/\Delta_1 \) for \( i = 1, 2 \). Therefore, \( R(j) = Q_2 P_2 [\pi_{21}(j) + \pi_{11}(j) \Delta_2/\Delta_1] \) and \( R'(j) = Q'_2 P'_2 [\pi'_{21}(j) + \pi'_{11}(j) \Delta_2/\Delta_1] \). We have \( \pi'_{21}(x) < \pi_{21}(x) \) from above and we have \( \pi'_{11}(x) < \pi_{11}(x) \) from \( \pi'_{12}(x) > \pi_{12}(x) \); similarly, we have \( \pi'_{21}(y) > \pi_{21}(y) \) from above and we have \( \pi'_{11}(y) > \pi_{11}(y) \) from \( \pi'_{12}(y) < \pi_{12}(y) \). This implies \( R(x) R'(y) > R'(x) R(y) \), concluding the proof of Lemma 2. QED. ■

When \( \Delta_1, \Delta_2 = 0 \), we have

\[
\frac{s_i}{w_i} \bigg|_{\Delta_1, \Delta_2, \Delta_3 = 0} = \frac{L_i}{H_i} \frac{\alpha_x + \alpha_y}{2 - (\alpha_x + \alpha_y)}.
\]

If \( \Delta_1, \Delta_2 \geq 0 \) and \( \Delta_3 = 0 \), we have \( \pi_{12}(x) = \pi_{12}(y) = \Delta_1, \pi_{21}(x) = \pi_{21}(y) = \Delta_2, \pi_{11}(x) = \pi_{11}(y) = 1 - \Delta_1 \), and \( \pi_{22}(x) = \pi_{22}(y) = 1 - \Delta_2 \), so that

\[
\frac{s_i}{w_i} \bigg|_{\Delta_1, \Delta_2 \geq 0, \Delta_3 = 0} = \frac{L_i}{H_i} \frac{\alpha_x + \alpha_y}{2 - (\alpha_x + \alpha_y)},
\]

which follows from Equation (7) and the fact that \( \pi_{ni}(x) = \pi_{ni}(y) \) for all \( i, n \). Hence,

\[
\frac{s_i}{w_i} \bigg|_{\Delta_1, \Delta_2, \Delta_3 = 0} = \frac{s_i}{w_i} \bigg|_{\Delta_1, \Delta_2 \geq 0, \Delta_3 = 0}.
\]

Combining Lemma 2 and Equation (25) yields

\[
\frac{s_i}{w_i} \bigg|_{\Delta_1, \Delta_2, \Delta_3 = 0} < \frac{s_i}{w_i} \bigg|_{\Delta_1, \Delta_2, \Delta_3 > 0}
\]

which concludes the proof of Proposition 1. QED. ■

Proof of Proposition 2. If country 1 has a comparative advantage in sector \( x \), then \( \Delta_3 > 0 \) if \( \Delta_1, \Delta_2 > 0 \). We first show that if \( \Delta_3 \geq \Delta'_{3} > 0 \), \( \Delta_1 = \Delta'_1 > 0 \), and \( \Delta_2 = \Delta'_2 > 0 \) then the following condition holds:

\[
\left( \frac{1}{a'} \times \left( \frac{s'_1/w'_1}{s'_2/w'_2} \right)^{\alpha_x - \alpha_y} \right)^{1/\theta'} \geq \left( \frac{1}{a} \times \left( \frac{s_1/w_1}{s_2/w_2} \right)^{\alpha_x - \alpha_y} \right)^{1/\theta}
\]

(26)

To see this, note that, according to Lemma 2, we have the following two relationships

\[
s_1/w_1 \geq s'_1/w'_1 \tag{27}
\]

\[
s_2/w_2 \leq s'_2/w'_2. \tag{28}
\]
According to Lemma 2, we also know that $\Delta_3 \geq \Delta'_3 > 0$ implies

\[
\pi_{12}(x) \leq \pi'_{12}(x) \tag{29}
\]
\[
\pi_{12}(y) \geq \pi'_{12}(y) \tag{30}
\]
\[
\pi_{21}(x) \geq \pi'_{21}(x) \tag{31}
\]
\[
\pi_{21}(y) \leq \pi'_{21}(y) \tag{32}
\]

Equations (29) – (32) together with Equation (6) imply

\[
\left( \frac{v_2(y)}{v_1(y)} \right)^{1/\theta} \leq \left( \frac{v'_2(y)}{v'_1(y)} \right)^{1/\theta'} \tag{33}
\]
\[
\left( \frac{v_2(x)}{v_1(x)} \right)^{1/\theta} \geq \left( \frac{v'_2(x)}{v'_1(x)} \right)^{1/\theta'} \tag{34}
\]

Combining Equations (33) and (34) with the definition of $v_i(j)$ and $v'_i(j)$ yields Equation (26).

Second, note that $\Delta_3 > 0$ and $\Delta'_3 > 0$ imply, respectively,

\[
\frac{1}{a} \times \left( \frac{s_1/w_1}{s_2/w_2} \right)^{(\alpha_x-\alpha_y)} < 1 \tag{35}
\]

and

\[
\frac{1}{a'} \times \left( \frac{s'_1/w'_1}{s'_2/w'_2} \right)^{(\alpha_x-\alpha_y)} < 1. \tag{36}
\]

We now use Equations (26), (35), and (36) to prove Proposition 2.

We now prove the comparative static result for $\theta$. To obtain a contradiction, suppose that $\theta > \theta'$, $a = a'$, and that $\Delta_3 \geq \Delta'_3 > 0$. Then

\[
\left( \frac{1}{a'} \left( \frac{s'_1/w'_1}{s'_2/w'_2} \right)^{(\alpha_x-\alpha_y)} \right)^{\theta/\theta'} \geq \frac{1}{a'} \left( \frac{s_1/w_1}{s_2/w_2} \right)^{(\alpha_x-\alpha_y)} \geq \frac{1}{a'} \left( \frac{s'_1/w'_1}{s'_2/w'_2} \right)^{(\alpha_x-\alpha_y)} \tag{37}
\]

where the first weak inequality follows from Equation (26) and $a = a'$ while the second weak inequality follows from Equations (27) and (28). Equation (37) combined with $\theta/\theta' > 1$, contradicts Equation (36). Thus, if $a = a'$, $\theta > \theta'$, and country 1 has a comparative advantage in sector $x$, then we must have $\Delta_3 < \Delta'_3$. Combined with Lemma 2, this yields the desired comparative static result for $\theta$.

Next, we prove the comparative static result for $a$. To obtain a contradiction suppose that $\theta = \theta'$, $a < a'$, and $\Delta_3 \geq \Delta'_3 > 0$. Then Equation (26) yields

\[
\frac{1}{a'} \times \left( \frac{s'_1/w'_1}{s'_2/w'_2} \right)^{(\alpha_x-\alpha_y)} \geq \frac{1}{a} \times \left( \frac{s_1/w_1}{s_2/w_2} \right)^{(\alpha_x-\alpha_y)} \tag{38}
\]
With \( a < a' \), Equation (38) requires \( s_i' w_i' s_{2j} < s_i w_i s_{2j} \), which contradicts Equations (27) and (28). Thus, if \( \theta = \theta' \), \( a < a' \), and country 1 has a comparative advantage in sector \( x \), then we must have \( \Delta_3 < \Delta_3' \). Combined with Lemma 2, this yields the desired comparative static result for \( a \). QED.

**Proof of Proposition 3.** Here we prove that if \( \tau < \tau' \), then \( s(\tau') \frac{w(\tau')}{s(\tau')} < s(\tau) \frac{w(\tau)}{s(\tau)} \). After setting out the necessary notation we proceed in three steps: Steps 1 and 2 are preliminary while Step 3 completes the proof of Proposition 3. In what follows we impose Assumptions A1 and A3.

**Notation:** Denote by \( \chi_{in} (z, j; \tau) \big/ \int_0^\infty \chi_{in} (z, j; \tau) \, dz \) the density of country \( n \) subsectors in sector \( j \) with productivity \( z \) supplying country \( i \), written explicitly as a function of the trade cost \( \tau \). Define \( \Delta \chi_{ii} (z, j) \equiv \chi_{ii} (z, j; \tau') - \chi_{ii} (z, j; \tau) \) and \( \Delta \chi_{-ii} (z, j) \equiv \chi_{-ii} (z, j; \tau') - \chi_{-ii} (z, j; \tau) \). Denote by \( \Omega_{ii} (j, \tau) \) the set of subsectors in sector \( j \) in which country \( i \) producers supply their domestic market; similarly denote by \( \Omega_{-ii} (j, \tau) \) the set of subsectors in which country \( i \) producers supply in sector \( j \) supply in the foreign country.

**Step 1:** If \( \tau < \tau' \) and \( \frac{w(\tau)}{s(\tau)} \geq \frac{w(\tau')}{s(\tau')} \), then \( \omega \in \Omega_{ii} (j, \tau) \) implies \( \omega \in \Omega_{ii} (j, \tau') \).

Let \( \tau < \tau' \) and \( \frac{w(\tau)}{s(\tau)} \geq \frac{w(\tau')}{s(\tau')} \) and suppose that \( \omega \in \Omega_{ii} (j, \tau) \), which is equivalent to \( \frac{c_{ii}(\omega, j; \tau)}{c_{i-1}(\omega, j; \tau)} \leq 1 \). There are two possible cases to consider: (i) \( z_{-i} (\omega, j) \geq z_i (\omega, j) \) and (ii) \( z_{-i} (\omega, j) < z_i (\omega, j) \). In case (i) we have \( \frac{c_{ii}(\omega, j; \tau)}{c_{i-1}(\omega, j; \tau)} \leq 1 \), since \( \frac{c_{ii}(\omega, j; \tau)}{c_{i-1}(\omega, j; \tau)} \) is weakly increasing in \( w/s \) if \( z_{-i} (\omega, j) \geq z_i (\omega, j) \) and is strictly decreasing in \( \tau \). Hence, in case (i) we have \( \omega \in \Omega_{ii} (j, \tau') \). In case (ii), we have \( \omega \in \Omega_{ii} (j, \tau'') \) for any \( \tau'' > 1 \); and in particular, \( \omega \in \Omega_{ii} (j, \tau') \). Thus, if \( \tau < \tau' \) and \( \frac{w(\tau)}{s(\tau)} \geq \frac{w(\tau')}{s(\tau')} \), then \( \omega \in \Omega_{ii} (j, \tau) \) implies \( \omega \in \Omega_{ii} (j, \tau') \), concluding the proof of Step 1.

**Step 2:** If \( \tau < \tau' \) and \( \frac{w(\tau)}{s(\tau)} \geq \frac{w(\tau')}{s(\tau')} \), then \( -\int_0^z \Delta \chi_{-ii} (v, j) \, dv < \int_0^z \Delta \chi_{ii} (v, j) \, dv \) for all \( z > 0 \), \( j = x, y \), and \( i = 1, 2 \).

Let \( \tau < \tau' \) and \( \frac{w(\tau)}{s(\tau)} \geq \frac{w(\tau')}{s(\tau')} \) and suppose that \( \omega \notin \Omega_{ii} (j, \tau) \). Then \( \frac{c_{ii}(\omega, j; \tau)}{c_{i-1}(\omega, j; \tau)} > 1 \), which requires \( z_{-i} (\omega, j) > z_i (\omega, j) \). Hence, \( \frac{c_{ii}(\omega, j; \tau)}{c_{i-1}(\omega, j; \tau)} > \frac{c_{ii}(\omega, j; \tau')}{c_{i-1}(\omega, j; \tau')} \). Thus, there must exist a positive mass of \( \omega \) for which \( \omega \notin \Omega_{ii} (j, \tau) \) and \( \omega \in \Omega_{ii} (j, \tau') \) for \( i = 1, 2 \). Choose an arbitrary \( (\omega, j) \) such that \( \omega \notin \Omega_{ii} (j, \tau) \) and \( \omega \in \Omega_{ii} (j, \tau') \). Then \( \omega \in \Omega_{-i} (j, \tau) \), \( \omega \notin \Omega_{-i} (j, \tau') \), and \( z_{-i} (\omega, j) > z_i (\omega, j) \). Moreover, for any \( (\omega, j) \) there is a positive probability that \( \omega \notin \Omega_{ii} (j, \tau) \) and \( \omega \in \Omega_{ii} (j, \tau') \) (so that \( \omega \in \Omega_{-i} (j, \tau) \) and \( \omega \notin \Omega_{-i} (j, \tau') \)). Hence,

\[
\Pr \left[ z_{-i} (\omega, j) < z \mid \omega \in \Omega_{-i} (j, \tau) \setminus \Omega_{-i} (j, \tau') \right] < \Pr \left[ z_i (\omega, j) < z \mid \omega \in \Omega_{ii} (j, \tau') \setminus \Omega_{ii} (j, \tau) \right]
\]

or, equivalently,

\[
\frac{\int_0^z [\Delta \chi_{-i} (v, j)] \, dv}{\int_0^z [\Delta \chi_{ii} (v, j)] \, dv} < \frac{\int_0^z \Delta \chi_{ii} (v, j) \, dv}{\int_0^z \Delta \chi_{ii} (v, j) \, dv}, \text{ for all } z > 0 \tag{39}
\]

---

36 This requires that the density of subsectors drawing a productivity \( z \) must be positive for all \( z \), but is otherwise independent of our choice of exponential distribution.
By symmetry: (i) $\chi_{i-i}(z,j) = \chi_{-i}(z,j)$ for almost all $z$, and (ii) \(\int_0^\infty -\Delta \chi_{i-i}(v,j) \, dv = \int_0^\infty \Delta \chi_{ii}(v,j) \, dv\).

Thus, according to Equation (39), we have \(\int_0^\infty [-\Delta \chi_{i-i}(v,j)] \, dv < \int_0^\infty \Delta \chi_{ii}(v,j) \, dv\) for all $z > 0$, $j = x, y$, and $i = 1, 2$, concluding the proof of Step 2.

**Step 3:** The skill premium $s/w$ is strictly decreasing in $\tau$.

Consider an arbitrary pair of trade costs $1 \leq \tau < \tau'$, and to obtain a contradiction, suppose that \(\frac{w(\tau)}{s(\tau)} \geq \frac{w(\tau')}{s(\tau')}\). According to Equation (5), and our normalization $w(\tau) L + s(\tau) H = 1$, this implies $w(\tau) \geq w(\tau')$ and $s(\tau) \leq s(\tau')$. Equation (15), the condition that $w(\tau) \geq w(\tau')$, and the fact that \(\frac{d}{d(w/s)} f \left( \frac{w}{s}, z, j \right) < 0\) together imply

$$\sum_{j=x,y} \int_0^\infty f \left( \frac{w(\tau)}{s(\tau)}, z, j \right) \Delta \chi_{ii}(z,j) \, dz \leq \sum_{j=x,y} \int_0^\infty f \left( \frac{w(\tau)}{s(\tau)}, z, j \right) [-\Delta \chi_{ii}(z,j)] \, dz. \quad (40)$$

Finally, \((i) \frac{d}{d\tau} f \left( \frac{w(\tau)}{s(\tau)}, z, j \right) < 0\) with $\varphi > 0$, (ii) and Step 2 imply37

$$\int_0^\infty f \left( \frac{w(\tau)}{s(\tau)}, z, j \right) \Delta \chi_{ii}(z,j) \, dz > \int_0^\infty f \left( \frac{w(\tau)}{s(\tau)}, z, j \right) [-\Delta \chi_{ii}(z,j)] \, dz \text{ for } j = x, y. \quad (41)$$

Hence, Equation (40) contradicts Equation (41). Therefore, if $\tau < \tau'$, then $\frac{w(\tau)}{s(\tau)} < \frac{w(\tau')}{s(\tau')}$. QED.

**Proof of Proposition 4.** We prove Part 1 and Part 2 separately.

**Part 1.** From Equations (9) and (10), we have $\lim_{\tau \to \infty} H_1 s_1 = \frac{1}{2} Q_1 P_1 (\alpha_x + \alpha_y)$ and $\lim_{\tau \to \infty} L_1 w_1 = \frac{1}{2} Q_1 P_1 (2 - \alpha_x - \alpha_y)$, since $\lim_{\tau \to \infty} \pi_{11}(j) = 1$ and $\lim_{\tau \to \infty} \pi_{21}(j) = 0$ for $j = x, y$. Hence, $\lim_{\tau \to \infty} (s_1/w_1) = (\alpha_x + \alpha_y) / (2 - \alpha_x - \alpha_y)$, so that $\frac{d}{d\alpha_x} \lim_{\tau \to \infty} (s_1/w_1) = 0$. Similarly, we have $\frac{d}{d\alpha_x} \lim_{\tau \to \infty} (s_2/w_2) = 0$, concluding the proof of Part 1 of Proposition 4.

**Part 2.** The cost of MP and $\theta$ affect the equations determining wages, Equations (9) and (10), through the $\pi_{ni}(j)$ terms. Here we show that in the limit as MP becomes costless, the $\pi_{ni}(j)$ terms have the same solution as in the limit as the dispersion of idiosyncratic productivity goes to zero. We focus here on $\pi_{12}(j)$, but the proof for all other $\pi_{ni}(j)$ terms is similar.

Consider $\pi_{12}(j)$ with MP:

$$\pi_{12}(j) = \Pr \left[ v_2(j) \tau_{12} \min \left\{ \frac{1}{z_2(\omega,j)}, \frac{\mu m_{12}(\omega,j)}{z_1(\omega,j)} \right\} \leq v_1(j) \min \left\{ \frac{\mu m_{21}(\omega,j)}{z_2(\omega,j)}, \frac{1}{z_1(\omega,j)} \right\} \right]$$

$$= \Pr \left[ v_2(j) \tau_{12} \min \left\{ \frac{\mu m_{12}(\omega,j)}{z_1(\omega,j)} \right\} \leq v_1(j) \right]$$

\[37\] This follows from the fact that if $\int_0^z f(v) \, dv < \int_0^z g(v) \, dv$ for any $z > 0$, and $h'(z) < 0$, then $\int_0^\infty f(v) h(v) \, dv < \int_0^\infty g(v) h(v) \, dv$. 


If \( \lim_{\mu \rightarrow 0} \frac{m_{ki}(\omega,j) \rightarrow 1}{} \), \( k, i \) then
\[
\lim \left\{ \frac{1}{z_2(\omega,j)} \frac{m_{ki}(\omega,j)}{z_1(\omega,j)} \right\} \rightarrow 1, \text{ and } \lim_{\mu \rightarrow 0} \frac{m_{ki}(\omega,j) \rightarrow 1}{} \pi_{12}(j)
\]

\[
= \Pr [v_2(j) \tau_{12} \leq v_1(j)].
\]

With only trade we have:
\[
\pi_{12}(j) = \Pr \left[ \frac{v_2(j) \tau_{12}}{z_2(\omega,j)} \leq \frac{1}{z_1(\omega,j)} \right] \frac{v_2(\omega,j)}{z_1(\omega,j)}
\]

where \( \lim_{\theta \rightarrow 0} \frac{z_2(\omega,j)}{z_1(\omega,j)} = 1 \), so \( \lim_{\theta \rightarrow 0} \pi_{12}(j) = \Pr [v_2(j) \tau_{12} \leq v_1(j)] \). Hence, \( \lim_{\mu \rightarrow 0} \frac{m_{ki}(\omega,j) \rightarrow 1}{} \pi_{12}(j)
\]

\[
= \lim_{\theta \rightarrow 0} \frac{w}{s} \text{ for } l = 1, 2. \text{ QED}. \]

Proof of Proposition 5. The proof of Proposition 5 follows very closely the proof of Proposition 3: Under Assumptions A1 and A3, we can write the factor market clearing conditions as:

\[
wL = \sum_{j=x,y} \int_0^{\infty} f \left( \frac{w}{s}, z, j \right) \left[ \chi_{in}^i(z, j; \mu) + \chi_{in}^{-i}(z, j; \mu) + \chi_{in}^{l-i}(z, j; \mu) \right] dz \quad (42)
\]

\[
sH = \sum_{j=x,y} \int_0^{\infty} g \left( \frac{w}{s}, z, j \right) \left[ \chi_{in}^i(z, j; \mu) + \chi_{in}^{-i}(z, j; \mu) + \chi_{in}^{l-i}(z, j; \mu) \right] dz.
\]

Here \( \frac{1}{w} f \left( \frac{w}{s}, z, j \right) \left( \frac{1}{z} g \left( \frac{w}{s}, z, j \right) \right) \) is the unskilled labor (skilled labor) demanded by a subsector in sector \( j \) producing in country \( i \) with productivity \( z \) in order to supply either its domestic or the foreign market, conditional on supplying the market. We define \( \chi_{in}^i(z, j; \mu) / \int_0^{\infty} \chi_{in}^i(z, j; \mu) dz \) as the density of productivities of sector \( j \) subsectors in country \( n \) that supply market \( i \) using productivity from country \( k \), written explicitly as a function of the MP cost \( \mu \). Note that with symmetric countries we have \( \chi_{in}^{-i}(z, j; \mu) = 0 \) because \( c_{in}^{-i}(\omega, j) > c_{in}^{i}(\omega, j) \). We let \( \Delta \chi_{in}^i(z, j) \equiv \chi_{in}^i(z, j; \mu') - \chi_{in}^i(z, j; \mu) \). Finally, we denote by \( \Omega_{ii}^k(j, \mu) \) the set of sector \( j \) subsectors in which country \( n \) producers supply country \( i \) using country \( k \)'s productivity.

We proceed in two steps. The first step is a preliminary step and the second step concludes the proof of Proposition 5.

Step 1: If \( 1 < \mu < \min \{ \mu', \tau \} \), and \( \frac{w(\mu)}{s(\mu)} \geq \frac{w(\mu')}{s(\mu')} \), then

\[
- \int_0^z \Delta \chi_{in}^{-i}(z, j) \, dv < \int_0^z \left[ \Delta \chi_{in}^i(z, j) + \Delta \chi_{in}^{-i}(z, j) \right] \, dv
\]

for all \( z > 0, j = x, y \), and \( i = 1, 2 \).

Let \( 1 < \mu < \min \{ \mu', \tau \} \) and \( \frac{w(\mu)}{s(\mu)} \geq \frac{w(\mu')}{s(\mu')} \), and suppose that \( \omega \in \Omega_{ii}^k(j, \mu) \). As in the proof of Proposition 3, it is easy to show that if \( \mu < \min \{ \mu', \tau \} \) and \( \frac{w(\mu)}{s(\mu)} \geq \frac{w(\mu')}{s(\mu')} \), then \( i \omega \in \Omega_{ii}^k(j, \mu) \).
implies \( \omega \in \Omega_{i}^{i}(j, \mu'; (ii) \omega \in \Omega_{-i}^{i}(j, \mu) \) implies \( \omega \in \Omega_{-i}^{i}(j, \mu' \); (iii) there exist a positive mass of \( \omega \) for which \( \omega \not\in \Omega_{i}^{i}(j, \mu) \) and \( \omega \in \Omega_{i}^{i}(j, \mu) \); (iv) there exist a positive mass of \( \omega \) for which \( \omega \not\in \Omega_{-i}^{i}(j, \mu) \) and \( \omega \in \Omega_{-i}^{i}(j, \mu') \); and (v) there exist a positive mass of \( \omega \in \Omega_{i}^{i}(j, \mu) \) for which \( \omega \not\in \Omega_{-i}^{i}(j, \mu) \).

Choose an arbitrary \( \omega \not\in \Omega_{i}^{i}(j, \mu) \cup \Omega_{-i}^{i}(j, \mu) \) and \( \omega \in \Omega_{i}^{i}(j, \mu') \cup \Omega_{-i}^{i}(j, \mu') \). Then \( \omega \in \Omega_{i}^{i}(j, \mu) \), \( \omega \not\in \Omega_{i}^{i}(j, \mu') \), and \( z_{-i}(\omega, j) > z_{i}(\omega, j) \); we have \( z_{-i}(\omega, j) > z_{i}(\omega, j) \), because if \( z_{-i}(\omega, j) \leq z_{i}(\omega, j) \) then no MP would take place for any \( \mu > 1 \), contradicting \( \omega \in \Omega_{i}^{i}(j, \mu) \). Of course, if \( \omega \not\in \Omega_{i}^{i}(j, \mu) \) and \( \omega \in \Omega_{i}^{i}(j, \mu') \), then the efficiency of production in subsector \( (\omega, j) \) is unaffected, since country \( -i \)'s productivity is used under either \( \mu \) or \( \mu' \). Nevertheless, for any \( \omega \) there is a positive probability that \( \omega \not\in \Omega_{i}^{i}(j, \mu) \), \( \omega \in \Omega_{i}^{i}(j, \mu') \), \( \omega \not\in \Omega_{i}^{i}(j, \mu) \) and \( \omega \in \Omega_{i}^{i}(j, \mu') \). Hence,

\[
\Pr \left[ z_{-i}(\omega, j) < z \mid \omega \in \Omega_{i}^{i}(j, \mu) - \Omega_{i}^{i}(j, \mu') \right] < \Pr \left[ z_{i}(\omega, j) < z \mid \omega \in \Omega_{i}^{i}(j, \mu') - \Omega_{i}^{i}(j, \mu) \right]
\]

or, equivalently,

\[
\frac{\int_{0}^{\infty} [-\Delta \chi_{i}^{i}(v, j)] dv}{\int_{0}^{\infty} [-\Delta \chi_{i}^{i}(v, j)] dv} < \frac{\int_{0}^{\infty} \left[ \Delta \chi_{i}^{i}(v, j) + \Delta \chi_{i}^{i}(v, j) \right] dv}{\int_{0}^{\infty} \left[ \Delta \chi_{i}^{i}(v, j) + \Delta \chi_{i}^{i}(v, j) \right] dv}, \text{ for all } z > 0
\] (43)

By symmetry

\[
\chi_{i}^{i}(z, j) = \chi_{-i}^{i}(z, j)
\]

and

\[
\int_{0}^{\infty} [-\Delta \chi_{i}^{i}(v)] dv = \int_{0}^{\infty} \left[ \Delta \chi_{i}^{i}(v) + \Delta \chi_{i}^{i}(v) \right] dv.
\]

Thus, according to Equation (43), we have

\[
\int_{0}^{z} [-\Delta \chi_{i}^{i}(v, j)] dv < \int_{0}^{z} \left[ \Delta \chi_{i}^{i}(v, j) + \Delta \chi_{i}^{i}(v, j) \right] dv, \forall z > 0, j = x, y, i = 1, 2
\]

completing Step 1.

**Step 2:** Consider an arbitrary pair of MP costs satisfying \( 1 < \mu < \min \{ \mu', \tau \} \). To obtain a contradiction, suppose that \( \frac{w(\mu)}{s(\mu)} \geq \frac{w(\mu')}{s(\mu')} \). According to Condition (5), and our normalization \( w(\mu) L + s(\mu) H = 1 \), this implies \( w(\mu) \geq w(\mu') \) and \( s(\mu) \leq s(\mu') \). Equation (15), the condition that \( w(\mu) \geq w(\mu') \), and the fact that \( \frac{d}{dz} s(f(w/s, z, j)) < 0 \) together imply

\[
\int_{0}^{\infty} f \left( \frac{w(\mu)}{s(\mu)}, z, j \right) \left[ \Delta \chi_{i}^{i}(z, j) + \Delta \chi_{i}^{i}(z, j) \right] dz \leq -\int_{0}^{\infty} f \left( \frac{w(\mu)}{s(\mu)}, z, j \right) \Delta \chi_{i}^{i}(z, j) dz \] (44)

\[38 \text{If } \mu \geq \tau, \text{ then no offshoring takes place, so that decreasing } \mu \text{ to } \mu' \text{ has no impact on the equilibrium.}\]
Finally, \( \frac{d}{dz} f \left( \frac{w(\mu)}{s(\mu)}, z, z \right) < 0 \) and Step 1 imply

\[
\int_0^\infty f \left( \frac{w(\mu)}{s(\mu)}, z, j \right) \left[ \Delta \chi^{i}_{ii}(z, j) + \Delta \chi^{i}_{ij}(z, j) \right] dz > - \int_0^\infty f \left( \frac{w(\mu)}{s(\mu)}, z, j \right) \Delta \chi^{i}_{ii}(z, j) dz. \tag{45}
\]

Equation (44) contradicts Equation (45). Thus, if \( \mu < \min \{ \mu', \tau \} \), then \( \frac{w(\mu)}{s(\mu)} < \frac{w(\mu')}{s(\mu')} \). \( \text{QED.} \)

**Proposition 6** If Assumptions A1 and A3 hold, then normalized trade in each country is strictly greater in the skill-intensive sector.

**Proof of Proposition 6.** The proof is in two steps. The first step is a preliminary step and the second step concludes the proof of Proposition 6.

**Step 1:** Suppose Assumptions A1 and A3 hold and fix an arbitrary pair of productivities \( z_i \equiv z_i(\omega(y)) = z_i(\omega(x)) \) and \( z_{-i} \equiv z_{-i}(\omega(y)) = z_{-i}(\omega(x)) \). Then \( z_i > z_{-i} \) implies \( \frac{c_{ni}(\omega(x))}{c_{n-i}(\omega(x))} < \frac{c_{ni}(\omega(y))}{c_{n-i}(\omega(y))} \) for \( n = i, -i \).

To obtain a contradiction, suppose that \( z_i > z_{-i} \) and

\[
\frac{c_{ni}(\omega(y))}{c_{n-i}(\omega(y))} \leq \frac{c_{ni}(\omega(x))}{c_{n-i}(\omega(x))} \quad \text{for } n = i \text{ or } n = -i. \tag{46}
\]

Equation (46) is equivalent to

\[
z_i^\varphi \leq z_{-i}^\varphi. \tag{47}
\]

With \( \varphi > 0 \) Condition (47) is equivalent to

\[
z_i \leq z_{-i},
\]

a contradiction that concludes the proof of Step 1.

**Step 2:** According to Step 1, the mass of subsectors that export from country \( i \) in the skill-intensive \( x \) sector is strictly greater than the mass that export from the unskill-intensive \( y \) sector, for all \( i \).

With \( \eta = 1 \), this implies that the value of a country’s exports plus its imports is greater in the \( x \) sector than in the \( y \) sector. Finally, with \( \eta = 1 \), the value of a country’s consumption is equal in the \( x \) and \( y \) sectors. Hence, normalized trade is strictly greater in the skill-intensive sector, concluding the proof of Proposition 6. \( \text{QED.} \)

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Figure 1: Trade Patterns by Sector

Figure 2: Skill premium and dispersion of productivities, Hicks-neutral technology
**Figure 3: Skill premium and skill bias of technology**

![Graph showing skill premium and skill bias of technology with two countries: skill-abundant and skill-scarce. The graph plots the log of the skill premium (trade/skill premium autarky) against a parameter φ.](image)

**Figure 4: Skill premium and dispersion of productivities, skill-biased technology**

![Graph showing skill premium and dispersion of productivities with two countries: skill-abundant and skill-scarce. The graph plots the log of the skill premium (trade/skill premium autarky) against a parameter φ.](image)
Figure 5: Normalized Trade by Sector

\[
\frac{\text{Exports} + \text{Imports}}{\text{Output} + \text{Imports} - \text{Exports}}, \quad \text{Country 1 in model and U.S. in data}
\]

Figure 6: Change in Sector Prices from Globalization

\[
\log \left( \frac{\text{price with globalization}}{\text{price autarky}} \right) \times 100, \quad \text{Skill-abundant country}
\]

Skill-biased
Hicks-neutral

Skill-biased
Hicks-neutral
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<tr>
<td>8 Manufacturing country 1, $D_{t_1}$</td>
<td>1.456</td>
<td>1.383</td>
<td>1.547</td>
<td>1.481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Non-manufacturing country 1, $D_{n_1}$</td>
<td>2.594</td>
<td>1.762</td>
<td>2.628</td>
<td>1.904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Trade cost country 3-country 1 ratio $(D_{i3-1})/(D_{i1-1})$, i=n,t</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>1.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Offshoring</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Dispersion of idiosyncratic offshoring costs, $\theta_m$</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Country-specific MP cost Country 1, $D_{m1}$</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Country-specific MP cost Country 3, $D_{m3}$</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>9.18</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>11.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Parameters</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Share of manufacturing in total output, $\gamma$</td>
<td>0.219</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Sectoral skill intensities</td>
<td>$\alpha$~$U(0.1,0.6)$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Endowment of unskill labor country 1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Endowment of unskill labor country 3</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Total factor productivity country 1, $A_1$</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 2: Baseline Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Calibration Targets</th>
<th>Skill-Biased Technology</th>
<th>Hicks-neutral Technology</th>
<th>Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trade only</td>
<td>Trade and MP</td>
<td>Trade only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 1/2*(Exports+Imports)/Output, Manufacturing, Country 1</td>
<td>0.227</td>
<td>0.229</td>
<td>0.227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2*(Exports+Imports)/Output, Non-Manufacturing, Country 1</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 1/2*(Exports+Imports)/Output, Manuf+Non-Manuf, Country 3</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>0.123</td>
<td>0.118</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Share of imports in country 1 from country 2, Manufacturing
  
- Level
  
- Elasticity of skill intensity to size, Country 3
  
- Effective elasticity of substitution between skills, Country 1
  
- Outward MP / Exports, Manuf+Non-Manuf, Country 1
  
- Share of Country 1's outward MP to Country 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other Statistics</th>
<th>Skill-Biased Technology</th>
<th>Hicks-neutral Technology</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trade only</td>
<td>Trade and MP</td>
<td>Trade only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Fraction of exporters, Manufacturing, Country 1</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Ratio size exporters to non-exporters, Manuf, Country 1</td>
<td>4.26</td>
<td>4.18</td>
<td>4.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Skill intensity exports minus non-exporters (logs), Country 1</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Skill intensity exporters minus non-exporters (logs), Country 3</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Counterfactuals</th>
<th>Skill Premium, log baseline/autarky x 100</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Country 1 and Country 2</td>
<td>3.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Country 3</td>
<td>5.69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Skill Premium, log baseline/(1/3 trade shares) x 100

### MP/exports initial level = 1.7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Counterfactuals</th>
<th>Skill Premium, log baseline/(1/3 trade shares) x 100</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Country 1 and Country 2</td>
<td>2.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Country 3</td>
<td>3.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 3: CALIBRATION OF TECHNOLOGY DISPERSION AND SKILL-BIAS OF TECHNOLOGY

**Panel A**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Technology Dispersion, $\theta$</th>
<th>0.025</th>
<th>0.05</th>
<th>0.10</th>
<th>0.15</th>
<th>0.20</th>
<th>0.25</th>
<th>0.30</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Share of imports in country 1 from country 2, Manufacturing, Difference Top 1/2 Skilled - Bottom 1/2 Skilled Sectors</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Panel B**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Skill-Bias of Technology, $\phi$</th>
<th>-0.24</th>
<th>-0.16</th>
<th>-0.08</th>
<th>0.00</th>
<th>0.08</th>
<th>0.20</th>
<th>0.37</th>
<th>0.48</th>
<th>0.64</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Elasticity of skill intensity to size, Country 3</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 4: SKILL INTENSITY AND NOMALIZED TRADE, U.S. 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Skill Intensity</td>
<td>0.716***</td>
<td>0.885***</td>
<td>0.872***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Median Elasticity</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average Elasticity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R^2</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dependent Variable: Normalized Trade

Standard errors are in parantheses. Skill intensity is defined as the share of non-production workers in employment. Normalized trade is defined as the ratio of sector exports plus imports to sector output plus imports minus exports. Median Elasticity and Average Elasticity are the median and average, respectively, SITCS elasticity of substitution from Broda and Weinstein (2006) in the BEA IO-code sector. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
## Table 5: Sensitivity Analysis and Other Counterfactuals

### Sensitivity Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>BASELINE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade only</td>
<td>Trade and MP</td>
<td>( \rho = 1.4 )</td>
<td>( \rho = 2 )</td>
<td>( \eta = 2 )</td>
<td>( \eta = 3.5 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Country 1 and Country 2</td>
<td>3.46</td>
<td>7.62</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>2.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Country 3</td>
<td>5.69</td>
<td>7.54</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>3.61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Skill Premium, log baseline/autarky x 100

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manuf. Only, ( \gamma = 1 )</td>
<td>Manuf. Only, ( \gamma = 1 )</td>
<td>Manuf. Trade Country 1 = 40%</td>
<td>MP/exports</td>
<td>( \theta m = 0.2 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade only</td>
<td>Trade + MP</td>
<td>Country 1 = 2.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Country 3</td>
<td>13.79</td>
<td>13.25</td>
<td>3.74</td>
<td>8.93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Counterfactuals: Composition and Extent of Globalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>12</th>
<th>13</th>
<th>14</th>
<th>15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Skill Premium, log difference relative to baseline x 100</strong></td>
<td>( H 3 / L 3 = H 1 / L 1 )</td>
<td>Double Trade Country 1 Same MP/Exports</td>
<td>Zero Gravity Only Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Country 1</td>
<td>-0.58</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td>10.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Country 3</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>6.31</td>
<td>9.69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>