This course is an introduction to field currently known as “Political Economy”, which lies at the intersection of economics and political science. It draws on theoretical tools and concepts used mostly in economics (such as game theory and the new institutional economics) to look into issues that are largely political.

Even though the emphasis is more on substantive than on technical issues, the class assumes knowledge of game theory and a disposition to work through technical material. One ongoing axes of the class will be to think about the models and theories being studied in terms of its potential ability to explain policymaking in Argentina.

The class will often have the format of a seminar. Students will have to read about 4 articles in advance every week, and come prepared to actively participate in class discussion. The approach is “hands on”, with the discussion not only of finished research products, but also of ongoing research.
Background Political Economy Models

0. Basics of Social Choice / Direct Democracy

1. Basic models of representative democracy / electoral competition
   a. Downs
   b. Median Voter
   c. Endogenous Entry
   d. Citizen-Candidate models
   e. Models with uncertainty / Probabilistic Voting
   f. Partisan Politics (more on Parties later)
   g. Basic models of Lobbying

2. Legislative Bargaining


Electoral Equilibria


Calvo and Murillo (forthcoming) “Electoral Responsiveness in Latin America”


Hirano, Snyder and Ting (2009) “Distributive Politics with Primaries” mimeo


Agency in Politics / Quality of Politicians

Persson and Tabellini (2000) (ch. 4)


**Voting**


**Institutions**


**Cooperation / Intertemporal Politics**


**Political Institutions and Policy Outcomes**

Persson and Tabellini 2000 (part III)


SOME POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

Executive & Relations Executive-Congress

Bonvecchi and Scartascini (2011) “The Presidency and the Executive Branch in Latin America: What We Know and What We Need to Know. Looking North to Understand the South” Mimeo, Inter-American Development Bank.


Congress


Parties/ Party System (Electoral Rules)

Ch 9 of Zakharov 2008 “Political Parties in Spatial Models”


Federalism


INSTITUTIONALIZATION


Endogenous Political Institutions – Democratization


ECONOMIC ACTORS, INTEREST GROUPS


van der Made (2009) “Endogenous Coalition Formation and Lobbying” Mimeo

Weymouth, S. (20xx) “Lobbying and Corporate Influence in Developing Countries: A Multilevel Approach”

Albornoz, Galiani, Heymann (2011) “Foreign Investment and Expropriation under Oligarchy and Democracy” Mimeo

Alternative Political Technologies


